Biosurveillance technology : providing situational awareness through increased information sharing by Logsdon, Jasie K.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2011-09
Biosurveillance technology : providing situational
awareness through increased information sharing
Logsdon, Jasie K.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
BIOSURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY: PROVIDING 









 Thesis Co-Advisors: Richard Bergin  
  Robert Josefek 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2011 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
Biosurveillance Technology: Providing Situational Awareness through 
Increased Information Sharing 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Jasie K. Logsdon 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.  IRB Protocol number NPS.2011.0042-IR-EP7-A_.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This need for the public health and medical enterprise to share information, has increased over the last decade, due to 
events such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak, natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, 
the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak, and other naturally occurring outbreaks, such as the recent Shiga toxin-producing 
E. coli O104 (STEC O104:H4) infections occurring in, and associated with, travel to Germany.   
This thesis explores the various ways that information sharing can be improved within the public health and 
medical enterprise.  Through case studies and interviews, a conceptual framework, the LEAPS model, was developed 
to guide the process to improve information sharing.  This model is based upon the establishment of a strong 
foundation in health information sharing and disease surveillance.  This model is centered upon leadership, policy, 
and strategy.  The LEAPS model framework is then expanded to offer specific ways for the public health and medical 
enterprise to improve information sharing within jurisdictions and sectors to rapidly detect and respond to naturally 
occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or exposures and to create better situational awareness and a common 
operating picture. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS public health, information sharing, biosurveillance, situational awareness, 
common operating picture, medical, disease surveillance, syndromic surveillance, disease reporting, 
bioterrorism, LEAPS model 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
141 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited  
 
 
BIOSURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY: PROVIDING SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS THROUGH INCREASED INFORMATION SHARING 
 
 
Jasie K. Logsdon 
Senior Epidemiologist, Lake Cumberland District Health Department, KY 
BS, Cumberland College, 2001;  
MPH, University of Kentucky, 2003 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
























Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD 
Chair, Department of National Security 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This need for the public health and medical enterprise to share information has increased 
over the last decade, due to events such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) outbreak, natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
outbreak, and other naturally occurring outbreaks, such as the recent Shiga toxin-
producing E. coli O104 (STEC O104:H4) infections occurring in, and associated with, 
travel to Germany.   
This thesis explores the various ways that information sharing can be improved 
within the public health and medical enterprise.  Through case studies and interviews, a 
conceptual framework, the LEAPS model, was developed to guide the process to improve 
information sharing.  This model is based upon the establishment of a strong foundation 
in health information sharing and disease surveillance.  This model is centered upon 
leadership, policy, and strategy.  The LEAPS model framework is then expanded to offer 
specific ways for the public health and medical enterprise to improve information sharing 
within jurisdictions and sectors to rapidly detect and respond to naturally occurring or 
intentional disease outbreaks or exposures and to create better situational awareness and a 
common operating picture. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The rapid emergence of new diseases and the resurgence of old diseases coupled 
with the threats of biological, chemical, and radiological terrorism underscore the need 
for a worldwide effort to improve situational awareness, common operating picture, and 
outbreak detection capabilities.  The rapid detection and response to disease outbreaks is 
paramount to mitigating the effects of disease on the population of the United States.  
This is vitally important for high consequence outbreaks such as pandemic influenza or 
an attack with a biological, chemical, or radiological agent.  At present, the United States 
does not have a robust and integrated information-sharing system, which is crucial to the 
early detection of an outbreak or exposure. Such a system provides situational awareness 
and a common operating picture during an event and aids in the execution of an 
appropriate countermeasures response.   
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness 
Act of 2006 (PAHPA), Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) 9, 10, and 21, 
and, most recently, the National Health Security Strategy (NHSS) have called for the 
protection of the health of Americans by facilitating information sharing across all sectors 
and jurisdictions in regards to health-related threats and events.  In response to this 
legislation and the HSPDs, the federal government has invested millions of dollars in the 
development and implementation of numerous separate and independent disease 
surveillance and biosurveillance systems.  Despite the millions of dollars invested, there 
was very little planning before these disparate systems were created and little, if any, 
coordination between systems.  Many of these systems are duplicative and most are not 
interoperable, causing vital information to be stovepiped and inaccessible.      
Recognizing the investments and infrastructure currently in place for disease 
surveillance and biosurveillance, the challenge lies in the integration of those systems to 
engender efficient information sharing across all health sectors.  Existing surveillance 
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systems provide minimal and largely ineffective situational awareness and a common 
operating picture, thereby hindering rapid and effective response to public health events 
of local, regional, national, or international significance.  
To put this issue in the proper context, the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak can be 
examined.  This particular influenza virus demonstrated the ease by which influenza can 
be transmitted by a global society; however, it was relatively mild in comparison to the 
initial planning scenarios and projections.  Had this virus been more virulent, like the 
1918 Spanish influenza the effects on the world’s population could have been much 
worse.  The fact that the national and global surveillance systems were not integrated and 
information was not shared in a timely manner could have had disastrous effects on the 
world’s population. 
Millions of dollars have been invested, legislation has been passed, and there have 
been multiple HSPDs in an effort to enable the United States to more rapidly detect 
disease outbreaks.  However, the existing systems do not facilitate information-sharing 
across the health and medical or homeland security enterprise, making it difficult for 
agencies to quickly mount appropriate countermeasures responses and to maintain 
situational awareness and a common operating picture.  The rapidly evolving and ever 
increasing number of health threats in the world only serves to further emphasize the 
need for better information sharing across all jurisdictions and levels.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
 How can the public health/medical enterprise improve information-sharing 
across jurisdictions and sectors to rapidly detect and respond to naturally 
occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or exposures and to create better 
situational awareness and a common operating picture? 
2. Secondary Questions 
 What systems are currently used to provide situational awareness and a 
common operating picture during naturally occurring or intentional 
disease outbreaks or exposures, and what are the current limitations of 
these systems? 
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 What are the barriers to information sharing in the current public 
health/medical enterprise? 
 How can the current systems be used, and what further actions can be 
taken to more rapidly detect and respond to outbreaks and to create better 
situational awareness and a common operating picture?   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Biosurveillance and public health disease surveillance literature is abundant.  
Literature regarding public health disease surveillance has a long history.  However, 
literature regarding biosurveillance, public health information sharing, and situational 
awareness is relatively new, with most literature being written after the events of 
September 11, 2001.  This is primarily due to the increased emphasis upon the United 
States’ ability to rapidly detect and respond to intentional and unintentional disease 
outbreaks.  Numerous sources of literature have been identified to guide the analysis and 
understanding of this topic; however, the scope of the literature reviewed will be confined 
to that written after 2000, as this is when biosurveillance was recognized as an important 
component of overall health and homeland security.   
The literature is diverse and includes documents from academia, advocacy 
groups, the federal government, professional journals, and government-funded projects.  
For the purposes of this literature review, the documents will be divided by the following 
methodology:  
1. Literature on the integration and coordination of current surveillance and 
biosurveillance systems 
2. Literature discussing the overarching barriers to information-sharing and 
those specific to health information sharing 
3. Literature pertaining to existing surveillance and biosurveillance systems 
and how they can be used to improve situational awareness 
The abundance of literature on this topic, especially recent government reports, 
speaks to the relevance, and significance of this topic. It reflects the awareness at the 
state, local, and national level of the importance of the efforts to develop a more robust 
system for the detection and response to naturally occurring or intentional disease 
outbreaks. 
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1. Integration and Coordination of Current Systems 
There is a significant amount of literature that discusses the need for integration 
and coordination of current disease surveillance systems; however, most do not offer a 
strategy to achieve this.  The literature discusses the importance of an integrated 
biosurveillance system, and how that will facilitate the rapid detection and response to 
health threats.  HSPD 21 provides the overall directive, necessary components and 
identifies stakeholders.  It discusses the need for a “nationwide, robust, and integrated 
biosurveillance capability,” which includes the integration of data from various sources 
(international, human and animal health, agricultural, environmental), to provide a 
nationwide common operating picture (White House, 2008). 
The intent of the 2010 National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health is to 
serve as a guide for implementation of a national network of biosurveillance (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response 
Biosurveillance Coordination Unit [CDC Biosurveillance Coordination Unit], 2010).  It 
discusses the need for a “system of systems” that fully uses the local level data collection 
and analysis (CDC Biosurveillance Coordination Unit, 2010). It goes on to discuss that 
biosurveillance efforts occurring at the state and local level allow for the interpretation 
and application of data in a local context, which can be supplemented and improved by 
national level data to provide a common operating picture (CDC Biosurveillance 
Coordination Unit, 2010).  However, this report does not offer a strategy for creating 
such a system. 
Specifically, the literature discusses national efforts such as the Public Health 
Information Network (PHIN), the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC), 
the National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS), and the National Center for 
Medical Intelligence (NCMI).  The Center for American Progress report Biosecurity: A 
Comprehensive Action Plan discusses both the PHIN and the NBIS.  The PHIN is a CDC 
effort to integrate state, local, and federal surveillance systems to create a unified network 
(Grotto & Tucker, 2006).  The report describes the NBIS as the government’s foremost 
initiative to develop “an integrated and comprehensive bio-surveillance system” linking 
surveillance efforts across jurisdictions and entities (Grotto & Tucker, 2006).  The GAO 
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report Biosurveillance: Developing a Collaboration Strategy is Essential to Fostering 
Interagency Data and Resource Sharing discusses the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) efforts to use the NBIS to develop the NBIC, an IT system that will integrate, 
analyze, and disseminate various biosurveillance and disease surveillance system’s data 
(Jenkins, W. O., Laffoon, A., Cooper, M., Dowdle, C., Godfrey, K., & Yohe, A., 2009).   
There is not a significant amount of literature to be found pertaining to the NCMI.  
A 2009 Department of Defense instruction document outlines the purpose and mission of 
the NCMI, stating, “NCMI is the DoD lead activity for the production of medical 
intelligence,” including “integrated, all-source intelligence” on health threats for the DoD 
and other government and international entities (United States Department of Defense 
[DoD], 2009).  However, in reading Enclosure 2 of the DoD instruction document, it 
seems the primary focus of the NCMI is to provide medical intelligence for the benefit 
and use of the military, with some ancillary intelligence being provided to the 
Intelligence Community. 
As noted above, the literature contains a vast amount of information pertaining to 
the need to integrate and coordinate existing surveillance systems nationwide.  The 
literature adequately demonstrates the importance of an integrated system in respect to 
providing near real-time situational awareness. Nonetheless, it offers no roadmap or plan 
for state, local, and national surveillance and/or biosurveillance systems integration. 
2. Information-Sharing Barriers 
Barriers to information-sharing are many and are cited throughout the literature. 
The barriers are similar throughout the various disciplines that collect and share 
information and intelligence.  The literature cites legal barriers, cultural barriers, and 
process oriented barriers as challenges to information sharing.     
a. Legal Barriers 
The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee 
discusses legal barriers in reference to critical infrastructure, in its report Legislative and 
Regulatory Task Force Report: Barriers to Information-sharing (2003).  This report cites 
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barriers to information sharing, which include the concern that critical infrastructure 
information might be disclosed under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests; the 
industry might face civil tort or contract liability issues; or there could be antitrust 
violations (National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, 2003).  Many of 
these issues carry over into the health information-sharing arena as well. 
Legal Impediments to Surveillance for Biological Threats and Countering 
Terrorism offers insight into the legal barriers that exist within public health and medical 
information-sharing (Sutton, 2002). Public health law is a constitutionally reserved power 
of the states, as awarded by the Tenth Amendment.  Furthermore, the report states, there 
is no law that exists that requires states to share their infectious disease information with 
federal officials and agencies (Sutton, 2002).  Because public health law is a state power, 
each states’ laws are different and do not always facilitate information sharing between 
states or between the states and the federal government.  This report goes on to discuss 
information privacy issues associated with surveillance as a barrier to information-
sharing (Sutton, 2002).  
b. Cultural Barriers 
The United States Department of Justice Law Enforcement Information-
sharing Program discusses the need to move from a “need to know” culture to a “need to 
share” culture (United States Department of Justice [DOJ], 2005).  Specifically relating to 
health information-sharing, the GAO Report Biosurveillance: Developing a 
Collaboration Strategy is Essential to Fostering Interagency Data and Resource Sharing, 
cites issues with “confusion, uncertainty, and skepticism” about the value of participation 
and “the mission and purpose” of the National Biosurveillance Integration Center has led 
to a lack of willingness to share information (Jenkins et al., 2009).  This report goes 
further to discuss cultural barriers such as trust and control over sensitive information, 
specifically prior to being vetted and verified.  
c. Process-Oriented Barriers 
The 2009 Information-sharing Report to Congress discusses the 
inconsistencies in processes and procedures for handling and safeguarding information 
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and that state, local, and tribal policies may differ greatly from the federal policies 
(Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, 2009). The GAO Report 
Biosurveillance: Developing a Collaboration Strategy is Essential to Fostering 
Interagency Data and Resource Sharing discusses the scant availability of data 
throughout the federal government primarily because most of the data and information 
needed for biosurveillance activities is generated and owned outside of the federal 
government (Jenkins et al., 2009).  According to the literature, state and local 
governments and private entities are predominantly the agencies that own the data needed 
for biosurveillance activities, and many of these entities are reluctant to conform to the 
standards set forth by the federal government for data sharing.  
The barriers to information sharing are numerous and are sometimes 
deeply ingrained within the discipline.  The literature cites barriers within various 
domains—legal, cultural, and process oriented.  There have been numerous reports 
published regarding information sharing and the barriers that exist, not only within the 
health and medical field, but within and among numerous entities.  It is interesting to note 
that even though the literature pertains to different disciplines, often times the barriers are 
the same. 
Although there is abundant literature published on the topic, there has 
been very little progress made to address the information-sharing barriers that exist 
within the public health/medical enterprise. The literature offers very little guidance and 
virtually no recommendations to address this issue.  The literature does an excellent job 
of outlining the challenges to information sharing; however, it does not offer a strategy to 
address those barriers to create an information-sharing environment that enables near 
real-time situational awareness and common operating picture.  Until a strategy is 
developed, there can be only limited progress toward an integrated biosurveillance 
system in the United States.   
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3. Existing Systems, How They Can be Used, and Their Limitations   
The literature that exists in regard to existing disease surveillance and 
biosurveillance systems and how they can be used is extensive. Some of the literature 
encourages the use of current disease surveillance and biosurveillance systems to 
accomplish the goals of biosurveillance.   
The GAO Report Biosurveillance: Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance 
Capability Need a National Strategy and a Designated Leader outlines the capability 
needs for biosurveillance—systems and equipment that rapidly detect and communicate 
the indicators of an event, quick analysis, and timely dissemination to decision makers 
(Jenkins et al., 2010). The literature discusses the local, state, and national disease 
surveillance and biosurveillance systems at great length, including the fact that these are 
the foundation for a national biosurveillance system.    
In his 2003 testimony on CDC’s Disease Surveillance System Efforts before the 
subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response, Select Committee on 
Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, Joseph M. Henderson, 
M.P.A., Director of the Office of Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response at the 
CDC, discusses how disease detection almost always occurs at the local level, usually by 
an astute clinician who reports the occurrence to the local health department (Henderson, 
2003). 
Most of the systems and capabilities the literature discusses are national systems 
that can be used by state and local entities to enhance and augment state and local 
systems.  These include initiatives that track non-traditional data such as school 
absenteeism, over-the-counter medication sales, and syndromic surveillance.  Syndromic 
surveillance is covered extensively in the literature; however, there is no clearly 
articulated consensus on the value of the information collected by syndromic surveillance 
systems. The most extensive and comprehensive review of federal level biosurveillance 
and disease surveillance systems is contained in the 2010 GAO Report Biosurveillance: 
Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability Need a National Strategy and a 
Designated Leader (Jenkins et al., 2010).  Appendix IV of this report provides an 
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overview of federal systems, including the agency/department responsible for oversight 
of the system, the information collected, primary users and primary providers of data, the 
system status, diseases of concern, and the type of information available from the system 
(Jenkins et al., 2010).   
The Stimson Center report, New Information and Intelligence Needs in the 21st 
Century Threat Environment, contains a relatively comprehensive list of national and 
international disease surveillance systems (Fischer et al., 2008).  Additionally, a 
whitepaper from the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Center for Biosecurity 
titled Creating Situational Awareness: A Systems Approach, offers a listing of existing 
systems and programs beyond federal disease surveillance and biosurveillance systems 
that relate to healthcare situational awareness and contribute or could contribute to 
biosurveillance activities (Toner, 2009). 
a. Limitations of Current Systems 
From a review of the literature, it is evident that there is a vast amount of 
information and data collected through various mechanisms of biosurveillance and 
disease surveillance systems.  The whitepaper Creating Situational Awareness: A 
Systems Approach, states that although these surveillance efforts absolutely provide 
information flows that did not exist before, it is not clear to what extent they have 
enabled a more robust understanding of disease outbreaks (Toner, 2009).  This 
whitepaper goes further to state that the systems that exist are used primarily to detect 
outbreaks, not to manage them and they do not have a clear concept of operations (Toner, 
2009).  There has been a lot of technology pushed into the field but there is not a lot of 
science behind the technology (Toner, 2009). 
As mentioned earlier, the literature discusses syndromic surveillance and 
debates its merits for use to provide situational awareness.  Creating Situational 
Awareness: A Systems Approach discusses the issues with syndromic surveillance, 
including the fact that these systems did not seem to provide an adequate picture of the 
scope of the outbreak quickly enough (Toner, 2009).  This report discusses CDC’s ILInet 
data on outpatient visits to sentinel physician offices, which is traditionally reported on a 
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weekly basis—not timely enough to identify emerging influenza outbreaks or provide 
decision makers with near real-time data for decisions regarding interventions (Toner, 
2009).  One very interesting finding regarding syndromic surveillance, according to 
Toner, is that a large outbreak of a clinically mild disease may not be detected by 
syndromic surveillance systems because these systems are designed to look for people 
who are sick enough to seek medical treatment and care (Toner, 2009). 
The National Health Security Strategy discusses the need for public health 
to be able to leverage the resources and to be coordinated with the organizations 
responsible for oversight of food safety, environmental protection, and workplace safety 
(United States Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], 2009). This strategy 
specifically notes that improvements are needed in monitoring for emerging infectious 
agents, including zoonotic and agricultural disease threats; vector surveillance; and health 
impacts of climate change (HHS, 2009). 
The Draft Biennial Implementation Plan for the National Health Security 
Strategy for the United States of America points out organizational and structural gaps 
that are barriers to the coordination of the existing systems and data (United States 
Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], 2010). It points out that currently 
there is no overarching organizational structure that ensures coordination of the disparate 
systems, and no entity has been given the authority to implement specific activities 
related to biosurveillance and disease surveillance (HHS, 2010). 
One of the elements the literature does not address in regard to system 
limitations is whether these systems have the ability to share data and information 
between systems.  The ability to share information between systems depends upon 
interoperability of systems and data standards.  Neither data standards, nor system 
interoperability, are discussed in the literature.  These are two important components that 
are necessary for successful integration of systems.   
Overall, the literature provides a fairly comprehensive review of the vast 
amount of disease surveillance and biosurveillance systems that are currently in 
operation.  It provides an adequate view of the systems’ capabilities and limitations.  
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However, there are areas that the literature does not delve into, such as the process for 
creating an integrated national biosurveillance system, which addresses data standards 
and interoperability challenges, policies, and a suggested format or structure for an 
integrated system.     
D. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the literature provides a broad look at information-sharing barriers, 
existing surveillance and biosurveillance systems, and the need for an integrated national 
biosurveillance enterprise.  It demonstrates the importance of biosurveillance in ensuring 
the health of our nation. However, it fails to address the underlying issues in regard to 
information sharing and only offers broad recommendations for improving the national 
biosurveillance enterprise. 
The literature comes from a wide range of sources, including works from 
academia, advocacy groups, the federal government, professional journals, and 
government funded projects.  It provides a fairly comprehensive examination of existing 
surveillance and biosurveillance systems, which includes a description of the strengths 
and weaknesses of each system, a historical perspective on the evolution of the 
biosurveillance systems, and a glimpse of possible future advancements. It is clear by the 
abundance of literature pertaining to the various disease surveillance and biosurveillance 
systems nationally and internationally that a comprehensive evaluation of all surveillance 
and biosurveillance systems is beyond the scope of this project.  Therefore, this study will 
focus on improving information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors to rapidly detect 
and respond to naturally occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or exposures and to 
create better situational awareness and a common operating picture.   
The literature provides a general overview of the barriers to information-sharing. 
Although there is an abundance of literature pertaining to existing biosurveillance 
systems, the literature neglects to discuss the limitations to information-sharing between 
these systems, including data standards and interoperability issues, nor does it go into 
great detail concerning strategies to address those barriers.  This lack of attention to 
strategy development is a fundamental roadblock in seeking to leverage disease 
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surveillance and biosurveillance systems.  It makes no policy recommendations or 
provides no solutions to removing the information-sharing barriers so that the national 
biosurveillance effort can be more effective in enhancing situational awareness and 
providing a common operating picture during events of public health significance.  
There is a consensus within the literature that existing state, local, and federal 
disease surveillance and biosurveillance systems must be integrated to achieve near-real 
time situational awareness; however, it offers very little guidance for achieving this.  The 
literature provides an effective argument that integration is the mechanism by which 
intentional and un-intentional disease outbreaks will be more rapidly detected, enabling a 
decisive response and implementation of appropriate countermeasures.  It provides 
general recommendations for the creation and implementation of a national integrated 
biosurveillance system; however, the literature does not identify a leader for the endeavor 
nor does it discuss specific plans for implementation of this endeavor.  It makes broad 
policy statements but does not make specific recommendations.   
It is evident in the review of existing documents that the public health and 
medical information-sharing and biosurveillance enterprise has evolved and will continue 
to evolve to meet the ever-changing challenges facing the United States. What is lacking 
in the literature is a clear detailed policy and roadmap for creation and implementation of 
a strategy to improve information sharing within the public health and medical enterprise 
or the creation of a nationwide biosurveillance system.  
E. TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
For the nation to be prepared to detect, respond to, and recover from a bioterrorist 
attack or a naturally occurring disease outbreak, information-sharing, situational 
awareness, and common operating picture should be improved.  To achieve this, 
traditional disease surveillance capabilities and biosurveillance capabilities at the local, 
state, and national level ought to be integrated.  The integration of these systems could 
provide local, state, and federal public health authorities and the larger homeland security 
enterprise with situational awareness and a common operating picture, which is essential 
to mitigation, response, and recovery from events of public health significance.  
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An integrated approach to biosurveillance could be developed by the federal 
government.  This integrated national biosurveillance system can include data from state 
and local data collection systems and may provide state and local public health 
authorities the ability to generate local situational awareness and common operating 
picture in addition to providing access to national-level intelligence and information.  The 
NBIC at DHS is the center in which all biosurveillance data from other federal agencies, 
local, state, and private sector agencies could be fused and disseminated.  The keys to 
success are getting all levels of stakeholders to agree to share information with the NBIC 
and to develop the necessary infrastructure to collect information from these partners.  
1. Why Should the Local, State, and Federal Systems Be Integrated? 
The rapid detection and response to disease outbreaks or exposures is essential to 
mitigating the effects of disease on the population.  A robust and integrated information-
sharing system is crucial to the early detection of an outbreak or exposure; providing 
situational awareness and a common operating picture during an event; and the execution 
of an appropriate countermeasures response.  This is vitally important for outbreaks such 
as pandemic influenza or an attack with a biological, chemical, or radiological agent, 
which have the potential to be a high consequence event. 
There have been numerous disease outbreaks over the past few years that provide 
a strong argument for the need to integrate surveillance systems from the local to the 
federal level.  None of the recent national disease outbreaks resulted from bioterrorism or 
intentional contamination of food or water supplies; however, they caused significant 
illness and greatly impacted the economy.  A recent example is the 2010 Salmonella 
Enteritidis outbreak associated with shell eggs.  Initial cases were identified in Minnesota 
in May 2010, and the preliminary identification of the source of the outbreak was 
identified two months later in July 2010, as cases continued to increase. Recalls of the 
implicated shell eggs from identified egg suppliers did not begin until mid-August 2010 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010).  At this point, this outbreak has 
caused over 1900 people to become ill, with the potential for many still unaccounted for 
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because of the amount of time from illness onset to the time the illness is reported—
typically two to three weeks but can potentially take up to six weeks (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2010).   
This outbreak, along with many others, demonstrates the need for a robust and 
integrated biosurveillance system.  This system would allow local data entry pertaining to 
an outbreak and provide local situational awareness and common operating picture.  This 
locally entered data could be visible to state and federal partners and fused with data from 
other jurisdictions and agencies, generating near real-time situational awareness and 
common operating picture across jurisdictions, thus allowing for a more rapid detection 
and response.   
2. What Data Is Needed? 
Biosurveillance demands more than traditional public health disease surveillance 
data.  Multiple types of data are needed for biosurveillance.  HSPDs 9 and 10, along with 
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, specify the 
data that must be collected for biosurveillance.  This includes data on human, animal, and 
plant health, food, and water quality (Jenkins et al., 2010).  There are numerous sub-
categories of data within these primary categories that are valuable in the overall 
biosurveillance effort and serve to enhance situational awareness and common operating 
picture.  Some examples are: pre-diagnostic health data, over-the-counter medication 
sales, laboratory data, air monitoring, and drinking water monitoring.  Open-source data, 
such as Google Flu Trends, Pro-Med Mail, newspaper headline searches, and social 
media must be included in biosurveillance data collection.  International health data is 
also important to biosurveillance efforts, as it assists in the prediction of possible disease 
threats to the U.S.  
3. Who Should Supply the Data?  
Biosurveillance data could be collected from the local and state level, as this is the 
predominant source of data collection.  With assistance from grants from the federal 
government, local, and state public health agencies have invested billions of dollars in 
disease surveillance and biosurveillance efforts.  States and localities have developed 
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disease surveillance and reporting systems, syndromic surveillance systems, outbreak 
management systems, and other biosurveillance systems and tailored them to meet their 
local needs and standards.  These systems have been effectively operating independently, 
meeting the needs at the state and local level.  According to Jenkins et al., in the GAO 
Report Biosurveillance: Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability Need a 
National Strategy and a Designated Leader: 
The responsibility and capacity for collecting most information related to 
plant, animal and human health, food, and environmental monitoring 
resides within state, local, and tribal governments, or private sector 
entities—such as hospital and other private health care providers. (Jenkins 
et al., 2010) 
Since most of the data exists within the local and state government or private sector, it is 
absolutely essential that the federal government partner with these agencies. 
The federal agencies that independently collect biosurveillance data or that 
receive, analyze, and fuse state and local data could allow for their data collection 
systems to be integrated in to the national biosurveillance system. Examples of this are 
the Environmental Protection Agency, United States Department of Agriculture, the Food 
and Drug Association, and Department of Interior. 
4. How Should the Systems Be Integrated? 
The integration of existing state and local disease surveillance and biosurveillance 
systems with federal systems is not an easy task.  It will require a larger investment by 
the federal government in order to achieve this mission.  The integration could take a 
“systems of systems” approach.  State and local stakeholders have existing systems and 
processes for disease surveillance, reporting, and biosurveillance, which will not be easily 
changed or adapted.  There are also private sector data sources that can be integrated, 
which use proprietary systems and share limited information with the public sector.  For 
this reason, national level systems need to have the ability to connect to and receive data 
from local and state systems, which can then be analyzed, fused, and disseminated to 
stakeholders vertically and horizontally, across the health and homeland security 
spectrum.    
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Additionally, national-level biosurveillance initiatives may be coordinated and the 
data produced by them shared with the National Biosurveillance Integration Center 
(NBIC).  This includes the efforts by the Centers for Disease Control BioPHusion Center, 
the Department of Defense National Center for Medical Intelligence, and other federal 
level initiatives.  These actions might  ensure achievement of a “national, robust, and 
integrated biosurveillance capability that provides timely warning and ongoing 
characterization of catastrophic biological events, drawing on the systems, resources, and 
information from existing human, animal, plant, food, and environmental surveillance 
activities” (Jenkins et al., 2010).  
For the United States to be prepared to confront the next event of public health 
significance (pandemic, biological attack, or naturally occurring disease outbreak), an 
integrated approach could be developed and led by the federal government.  For overall 
situational awareness and common operating picture, data must be collected, analyzed 
and fused from local, state, federal, international, and private sector agencies.  The NBIC, 
through its “integration of biosurveillance elements and other data (including human 
health, animal health, agricultural, meteorological, environmental, intelligence, and other 
data)” has the ability to provide “a nationwide, robust, and integrated biosurveillance 
capability, with connections to international disease surveillance systems, in order to 
provide early warning and ongoing characterization of disease outbreaks in near real-
time”(White House, 2008).  
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Public health and medical information sharing has evolved greatly over the past 
decade.  There has been a significant amount written in regard to the need for public 
health and medical information sharing, specifically biosurveillance, as a mechanism to 
increase situational awareness and common operating picture.  In particular, the literature 
addresses the need for an integrated national biosurveillance enterprise.  However, the 
literature is lacking a clear, detailed policy and roadmap for creation and implementation 
of a nationwide biosurveillance system.  This research may serve as an initial roadmap 
for the implementation of an initiative to improve information sharing, including the 
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development of a national biosurveillance system through the integration of disparate 
systems, including systems that track human, animal, and plant health, as well as food 
recalls, weather, as well as the development of new systems.  It will contribute data and 
analysis to a relatively new field of research.  Additionally, it will justify the need for 
clearly defined leadership to drive the effort toward improved information sharing, as 
well as the development and enforcement of policies and an overarching strategy to 
improve information sharing.  Ultimately, this will increase the level of health security 
and public health emergency preparedness of the United States against events of public 
health significance by facilitating near real-time situational awareness and common 
operating picture at all levels and jurisdictions. Officials in local, state, and federal public 
health agencies, government officials charged with emergency preparedness and 
response, and private sector healthcare institutions should find this research beneficial to 
their day-to-day disease surveillance and biosurveillance operations as well as their 
preparedness planning and response efforts for events of public health significance.  
Government officials charged with enhancing the nation’s information sharing and 
biosurveillance capabilities should find this research advantageous in integrating existing 
systems.  It will also be beneficial in developing an overall concept of operations and 
model for improving information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors to rapidly detect 
and respond to naturally occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or exposures and to 
create better situational awareness and a common operating picture. 
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II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A qualitative analysis of case studies and interviews was conducted to address the 
research questions in this thesis.  The overall premise of the research questions focuses 
upon how information sharing within the public health and medical enterprise can be 
improved to more rapidly detect and respond to intentional disease outbreaks or 
exposures and to create better situational awareness and a common operating picture.  
Specifically, through the analysis of case studies and interviews, it examines current 
systems, how they are used and their limitations; barriers to information sharing; and 
what further actions may be taken to more rapidly detect and respond to outbreaks and to 
create better situational awareness and a common operating picture.  Using an inductive 
approach, government reports, academic research, and advocacy group reports pertaining 
to the existing disease surveillance and biosurveillance systems were examined to 
identify strengths and weaknesses, existing gaps, and policies that limit the ability to 
provide near real-time situational awareness and common operating picture.  
Additionally, interviews of subject matter experts and officials in the field of 
biosurveillance were conducted.  Based upon analysis of information contained within 
the case studies and from qualitative analysis of interviews, this study presents a 
conceptual model to improve information sharing within the public health and medical 
enterprise, which includes private sector partners, as well as, local, state, and federal 
government agencies.   
A. SAMPLE/DATA COLLECTION  
1. Case Studies 
Case studies related to public health information sharing, including public health 
disease surveillance systems, syndromic surveillance systems, and biosurveillance 
systems from the United States and other countries throughout the world were selected to 




The following case studies were selected: 
 Framework for the Development of Response Protocols for Public Health 
Syndromic Surveillance Systems: Case Studies of 8 US States 
 BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance: Evaluating Systems for the 
Early Detection of Biological Threats 
 Public Health Preparedness Informatics Infrastructure: A Case Study in 
Integrated Surveillance and Response: 2004-2005 National Influenza 
Vaccine Shortage 
 Real-Time Biosurveillance Pilot in India and Sri Lanka 
The Framework for the Development of Response Protocols for Public Health 
Syndromic Surveillance Systems: Case Studies of 8 U.S. States (Uscher-Pines et al., 
2009) is a case study of health departments in eight states and their use of syndromic 
surveillance systems and associated protocols.  This study describes current syndromic 
surveillance system response protocols and based upon the research findings makes a 
recommendation for a framework to guide initial design or enhancement of response 
protocols (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009). 
The BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance: Evaluating Systems for the Early 
Detection of Biological Threats (IOM & NRC, 2011) is a review and assessment of the 
effectiveness of the BioWatch program and the public health and healthcare system.  This 
report provides the findings and conclusions of the Committee on Effectiveness of 
National Biosurveillance Systems regarding the merits of the BioWatch System and the 
public health and healthcare systems, the costs of each system, and recommendations for 
enhancements to strengthen the nation’s biosurveillance capacity (IOM & NRC, 2011).  
The Public Health Preparedness Informatics Infrastructure: A Case Study in 
Integrated Surveillance and Response: 2004–2005 National Influenza Vaccine Shortage 
(Gotham, Le, Sottolano, & Schmidt, 2008) looks at the advantages of an existing 
integrated informatics infrastructure for health information exchange in New York state.  
This report describes how the existing infrastructure provided a foundation for and 
improved the effectiveness of the response to the influenza vaccine shortage (Gotham et 
al., 2008). 
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The Real-Time Biosurveillance Pilot in India and Sri Lanka (Waidyanatha et al., 
2010) is a case study of a pilot project that introduces modern biosurveillance 
technologies to health departments in India and Sri Lanka.  It provides an overview of the 
technologies implemented and the initial findings regarding the usability of the systems 
(Waidyanatha et al., 2010). 
2. Interviews  
Subject matter experts and officials in the fields of disease surveillance and 
biosurveillance were interviewed.  These individuals included an expert from academia 
who has published numerous articles pertaining to biosurveillance methodologies; two 
experts from the field of public health who are Career Epidemiology Field Officers; and a 
federal-level expert from the field of homeland security.  These interviews provide the 
opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of existing systems and initiatives related to 
public health/medical information sharing; barriers to information sharing within the 
existing systems; and how those systems, in conjunction with other actions, might be 
used to more rapidly detect and respond to outbreaks and to create better situational 
awareness and common operating picture.  As with most qualitative research, the 
interview questions were open-ended so as to elicit the greatest amount of feedback from 
those who were interviewed. 
Each interviewee was contacted by e-mail to provide background information on 
this project as well as to make the request for each to participate in the study.  The 
interviewees were provided a copy of the interview questions. The interview questions 
were open-ended, so as to allow the respondent the most freedom to craft their response 
and provide optimum feedback.  The interviewees’ identities are protected and are not 
revealed in the thesis.   
B. DATA ANALYSIS 
Data from each case study was analyzed in a structured focused comparison.  
Elements to be analyzed are: existing systems for public health information sharing, 
disease surveillance, and biosurveillance; barriers to information sharing; uses and 
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potential uses for existing systems; and actions taken, including policy development and 
standards, to increase situational awareness and common operating picture. 
An inductive, qualitative analysis of the interviews was conducted to identify 
themes, concepts and common thoughts on existing systems for public health information 
sharing, disease surveillance, and biosurveillance; barriers to information sharing; uses 
and potential uses for existing systems; and actions taken or future initiatives, including 
policy development and standards, to increase situational awareness and common 
operating picture.  This thematic analysis forms the basis of the conclusions drawn from 
this study. For comparison purposes, the interview results were analyzed in tables using 
the same categories used for analysis of the case studies.  However, the open-ended 
interview questions provided an abundance of information therefore additional categories 
are added to the interview analysis. The original categories along with the additional 
categories were used to identify themes, concepts, and common thoughts on existing 
systems for public health information sharing, disease surveillance, and biosurveillance; 
barriers to information sharing; uses and potential uses for existing systems; and actions 
taken or future initiatives, including policy and standard development, to increase 
situational awareness and common operating picture.  Based on the interview data, 
analysis and conclusions, recommendations have been formulated on the development of 
a conceptual model to improve information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors to 
rapidly detect and respond to naturally occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or 
exposures and to create better situational awareness and a common operating picture.   
The goal of this research is to develop a conceptual model to improve information 
sharing within the public health and medical enterprise.  The conceptual model developed 
is based upon the results from the analysis of the interviews conducted and the analysis of 
case studies related to public health information sharing, including public health disease 
surveillance systems, syndromic surveillance systems, and biosurveillance systems from 
the United States and other countries throughout the world.  This proposed model could 
serve as an initial framework for the improvement of information sharing within the 
public health and medical enterprise, as well as the impetus for the development and 
implementation of an integrated national biosurveillance enterprise.  
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III. DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND BIOSURVEILLANCE 
SYSTEMS CASE STUDIES 
A. SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE CASE STUDY 
After the events of September 11, 2001, many health departments began investing 
in syndromic surveillance technology.  Syndromic surveillance includes “data sources 
such as nurse hotline calls, over-the-counter medication purchases, and chief complaints 
from emergency departments to monitor clusters of similar illness based on shared 
clinical presentation and in some cases tracking a single case of reportable disease” 
(Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).  Syndromic surveillance systems have been “compared with a 
smoke detector that cannot serve its intended purpose without the timely public health 
response launched after aberration detection” (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).  Significant 
investments have been made in establishing syndromic surveillance systems and research 
on these systems has predominantly focused upon system performance and the 
comparison of detection algorithms.  Few studies have specifically assessed the response 
protocols related to syndromic surveillance. 
The Framework for the Development of Response Protocols for Public Health 
Syndromic Surveillance Systems: Case Studies of 8 US States seeks to assess response 
protocols related to syndromic (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009) surveillance system alerts and 
the related guidance provided to public health practitioners.  This case study consisted of: 
“semistructured interviews, textual analysis, and Delphi surveys” (Uscher-Pines et al., 
2009).  The goal of the interviews and surveys were to: 
…thoroughly describe response protocols for syndromic surveillance 
systems in place in 8 diverse states and their surrounding local public 
health departments, and to develop a framework for public health 
departments to use as a guide in initial design and/or enhancement of 
response protocols. (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009) 
For the study, eight states out of 35 states with existing syndromic surveillance 
systems were selected from mutually exclusive categories (e.g., population size, locus of 
outbreak response) and based upon vulnerability to terrorist attack (Uscher-Pines et al., 
2009).  Participants for the semistructured interview process were selected by using three 
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approaches: contacting state epidemiologists requesting contact information for local 
health departments responsible for monitoring syndromic surveillance systems, snowball 
sampling (asking interviewees for additional contacts), and review of academic and gray 
literature for examples of health departments engaged in syndromic surveillance activities 
(Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).   
To achieve the second goal, an expert panel was assembled.  According to the 
authors, “two data sources were used to inform surveys of the expert panel:  transcripts 
from the initial interviews with health department staff and text of response protocols” 
(Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).  From these data sources, “a comprehensive list of response 
protocol elements for public health surveillance systems” was defined by the author 
(Institute of Medicine [IOM] and National Research Council [NRC], 2011).  This panel 
participated in a two-round Delphi process.  For the first round, the expert panel was 
provided with the initial comprehensive list of response protocol elements.  The experts 
were asked to “comment on the completeness of the list and to add any additional 
elements” (IOM & NRC, 2011). For the second round of the Delphi process, participants 
received a questionnaire containing the elements chosen during round one and were 
asked to consider, “How important is it for a health department to include a given 
element in its written response protocol, given the resource constraints health 
departments typically face?” (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009). 
The results for study objective one were divided into the following categories: 
description of systems; written protocols; uses of syndromic surveillance; regularity of 
monitoring; and investigation and notification (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).  Thirty health 
departments participated in the study; of those, 23 were active syndromic surveillance 
users.  The study found that health departments monitored an average of 1.6 systems, 
including the Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS), BioSense, 
Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based 
Epidemics (ESSENCE), homegrown/unique systems, National Retail Data Monitor, First 
Watch, Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS), BioDefend, Syndrome Reporting 
Information System, RedBat, and Harvard-Pilgrim (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).  Eleven of 
the 23 health departments who were active syndromic surveillance users had written 
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response protocols; however, many had not been updated within the past 12 months.  The 
study notes, “A consistent theme that emerged in interviews was the lack of a systematic 
process in designing protocols and few available informational resources or templates for 
response” (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).   
In the study, users noted the following to be the most common uses of syndromic 
surveillance: “to achieve situational awareness; to confirm, collaborate on, or rule out an 
event of significance; to support traditional epidemiological investigations (e.g., an 
investigation launched per the report of a clinician in the community who contacts the 
health department); to do targeted case finding; and to analyze trends” (Uscher-Pines et 
al., 2009).  Other sorts of uses noted by interviewees included: identifying single cases of 
reportable disease that were not reported, as a decision making tool for issuing heat 
advisories, to rule out BioWatch alerts, and to “work backward” (Uscher-Pines et al., 
2009).   
The case study notes that the original purpose for syndromic surveillance was 
early warning or detection; however, no health department reported using the systems for 
that purpose.  System monitoring was at least daily by most health departments, although 
some reported the inability to monitor after-hours or on weekends.  Responses to alerts 
were classified into two categories: within-system1 and beyond-systems2 investigations 
(Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).  Based upon interview responses, most alerts were subject to 
a within-systems investigation; however, health departments rarely conducted beyond-
systems investigations.  This is primarily due to the ability of the health departments to 
“rule out” suspicious alerts by checking for “causes of false positives within the system, 
limited resources to respond to every signal, and concerns about inconveniencing hospital 
staff” (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009). 
Although interviewees noted written protocols that outlined notification policies, 
many had no actual experience in dealing with suspicious alerts or considered regular 
                                                 
1 Within-systems investigations: “the data monitor only uses the tools available through syndromic 
surveillance or supportive biosurveillance systems”(Uscher-Pines et al., 2009) 
2 Beyond-systems investigations: “the monitor brings in additional resources such as hospital staff” 
(Uscher-Pines et al., 2009). 
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communication with community partners and internal staff to be sufficient.  Respondents 
also noted reluctance to notify the State Department of Health because of lack of 
resources to support an investigation, lack of enthusiasm at the state level in regard to 
syndromic surveillance, and belief that events could be handled at the local level (Uscher-
Pines et al., 2009).  Additionally, respondents noted a lack of state coordination across 
regions or jurisdictions and no state oversight over multijurisdictional issues. 
Study objective two included the review of existing written protocols; the 
compilation of a list of possible response protocol elements from interview transcripts 
and existing protocols; the assessment of the possible protocol list; and the rating of the 
necessity of identified written protocols.  There were “thirty-two protocol elements 
identified within five distinct categories as essential elements according to expert 
consensus (essential elements are those that more than 50% of experts defined as 
essential, rather than desirable or not necessary),” they included: “description of system; 
monitoring policies; response procedures; role of syndromic surveillance response 
protocols within additional health department plans/protocols; and other” (Uscher-Pines 
et al., 2009). 
The study found that the usefulness of syndromic surveillance systems “will be 
limited without the necessary infrastructure and methods to conduct an effective response 
and the active participation and cooperation of partners at the hospital level” (Uscher-
Pines et al., 2009).  Less than half of the surveyed health departments had written 
response protocols and the majority of those who had protocols had not updated them 
within 12 months.  The absence of protocols was not regarded as a serious problem 
because health department personnel believed that response procedures were “understood 
and practiced” through daily communications between the community and public health 
partners (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).   
The study authors note one possible interpretation of the findings:  
…health department staff may question the need for written protocols 
because the focus of syndromic surveillance may be shifting away 
gradually from early warning and toward situational awareness (and most 
protocols are focused on alerts), and because specific instances in which  
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syndromic surveillance first detected previously unknown events of public 
health significance have not often been identified. (Uscher-Pines et al., 
2009)   
There are instances, however, in which the authors note that written protocols are 
necessary, including: situations in which a health department is not in daily 
communication with local hospitals; when there are multiple system users with different 
monitoring responsibilities within one health department; instances where there is 
frequent staff turnover; and where there are complex jurisdictional issues concerning 
response (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009). Another reason to indicate that syndromic 
surveillance systems are used for situational awareness is the fact that “less than 15% of 
alerts were tracked in a beyond-systems investigation” (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).   
The second phase of this study allowed for the development of a generic 
framework for health department use.  The expert panel who participated in the Delphi 
survey “emphasized elements related to interfacing with systems and communicating 
findings” (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).  The authors note that the framework developed in 
the study will allow health departments to “apply vetted response policies or enhance 
existing ones; furthermore having descriptions of the system(s), appropriate analyses, and 
investigation steps consolidated into a prototype comprehensive plan will provide 
material for training new staff” (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).  Furthermore, having 
standardized written protocols will support the integration of local jurisdiction outbreak 
response with regional, state, and national efforts.   
Syndromic surveillance capabilities are tied to human resources for detection and 
response and achievement of actual preparedness.  Health departments could benefit from 
the use of resources such as the guidance outlined in this study to build upon current 
response systems and improve their ability to “act upon—not merely detect—cases of, 
events of, and trends in public health significance” (Uscher-Pines et al., 2009).   
B. INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE AND RESPONSE CASE STUDY 
The authors of Public Health Preparedness Informatics Infrastructure. A Case 
Study in Integrated Surveillance and Response: 2004–2005 National Influenza Vaccine 
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Shortage state, “effective Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) requires 
integrated information systems supporting key PHEP activities including surveillance, 
alerting, situational awareness, emergency planning and response, resource assessment 
and management” (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 42).  Having an informatics framework for 
health information exchange provides considerable advantages concerning advanced 
preparedness and just-in-time response to events of public health significance. 
The Public Health Preparedness Informatics Infrastructure. A Case Study in 
Integrated Surveillance and Response: 2004–2005 National Influenza Vaccine Shortage 
(Gotham et al., 2008) seeks to describe how an established health information exchange 
framework supported and enhanced the effectiveness of New York’s response to the 2004 
national influenza vaccine shortage. 
In October 2004, production problems at Chiron, a major influenza vaccine 
manufacturer, cut the United States’ supply of influenza vaccine in half.  To compound 
issues, influenza vaccine was in high demand because of previous severe flu seasons.  
The response to this event “covered the spectrum of PHEP activities” (Gotham et al., 
2008, p. 43).  The CDC’s plan to address the situation consisted of two phases: 1) release 
of limited vaccine orders, previously placed with alternate manufacturers, for providers 
and health care facilities according to estimates of risk group needs;” and 2) “state-wide 
orders for vaccine to meet priority risk group needs unmet by Phase I and other deliveries 
made prior to the shortage” (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 43).     
In order to deal with the shortage, States activated their emergency response plans 
to: 
1. Assess vaccine availability through previous orders and CDC Phase I 
2. Assess unmet priority risk group vaccine needs across health care 
facilities, updating as the situation changed 
3. Analyze and estimate vaccine to be ordered through CDC Phase II, 
updating as the situation evolved 
4. Develop a statewide allocation and distribution plan for LHDs and health 
care facilities, based on the order placed with CDC, updating as the 
situation changed in the field (Gotham et al., 2008, p.43) 
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This endeavor, as noted by the authors, required prompt “communication, 
coordination, and assessment of needs and supplies across local health departments and 
health care facilities” (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 43).  
The vaccine shortage occurred at the optimal time for influenza vaccination, 
leading to the possibility of increased influenza activity in the coming flu season.  This 
required heightened surveillance for influenza cases as well as an increase in monitoring 
of health care resources (e.g., bed availability and emergency department visits).  The 
study notes that “there was an absolute and urgent need for statewide situational 
awareness by decision makers across all information flows related to the event” (Gotham 
et al., 2008, p. 43). 
Prior to the vaccine shortage, the New York State Department of Health 
(NYSDOH) had developed an “informatics framework and strategic information 
infrastructure to support information exchange with its health information trading 
partners” (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 44).  This secure, web-enabled portal, Health 
Commerce System (HCS), supports the information exchange between all regulated 
health entities in New York.  The HCS supports a wide range of health-related activities, 
to include “vital records, health care quality assurance and finance, disease registry and 
condition reporting, statewide communicable disease and laboratory reporting, arbovirus 
surveillance, child health insurance reporting, managed care, even prescription pad 
orders” (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 44).  This infrastructure is well suited for public health 
emergency response because of its existing architecture and routine use by response 
partners.  It is an “integral component of the NYSDOH incident management system and 
PHEP plans” and has supported statewide responses to “emergent infectious disease 
events, emergency disaster declarations, health resource shortages, elevated national 
threat levels, and high-profile security events” (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 45). 
The study notes that the HCS system was in operation prior to the vaccine 
shortage and had been used in preparedness exercises and other PHEP events prior to 




vaccine shortage were: the Hospital Emergency Response Data System (HERDS), the 
Integrated Health Alerting and Notification System (IHANS), and the dashboard-secure 
collaboration form (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 47).   
The HERDS system is used by all hospitals, local health departments, nursing 
homes, adult- and home-care entities, and schools.  It was routinely used by hospitals at 
the time of the vaccine shortage and prototypes were deployed to local health 
departments and nursing homes.  In response to the vaccine shortage, the HERDS system 
was used for ongoing monitoring of bed availability and hospital emergency department 
visits, as well as a statewide hospital-based surveillance system for pediatric influenza 
(Gotham et al., 2008, p. 47).  During the shortage, the NYSDOH used HERDS to deploy 
a vaccine inventory survey to all hospitals.  The study discusses the fact that just prior to 
the influenza vaccine shortage, the HERDs system was used to conduct a statewide 
survey of hospital critical assets in preparation for the 2004 Republican National 
Convention.  The information collected in that survey proved beneficial to resource 
allocation and response activities related to the vaccine shortage. 
In order to respond to the vaccine shortage, the NYSDOH needed to:  
1) assess and update data on vaccine inventories, orders, and needs for 
priority risk groups in the state; 2) develop ordering requirements for CDC 
Phase II; 3) develop an in-state allocation and distribution plan based on 
up-to-the-minute data; 4) assure rapid and effective communication with 
LHDs and health facilities; 5) monitor the effects of increased influenza 
activity or hospital utilization due to vaccination shortfalls; 6) detect local 
increases in influenza activity; 7) assure overall situational awareness for 
NYSDOH executive incident command process and for external response 
partners. (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 48)  
Through the use of HERDS, the NYSDOH completed and continuously updated a 
statewide needs assessment across hospitals and healthcare facilities.  Data collection 
from facilities not using HERDS was “laborious and time consuming” (Gotham et al., 
2008, p. 48).  The data collected via HERDS allowed the NYSDOH to rapidly develop a 
data-driven vaccine allocation plan for the state.  The HERDS system also allowed for 
tracking and trending of emergency department visits, including the ability to monitor, 
verify, and discount indications of anecdotal reports of emergency department or hospital 
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overcrowding.  Having the surveillance process for pediatric influenza in place allowed 
for the expansion to inclusion of laboratory-confirmed influenza for all age groups.  The 
authors note that this “greatly facilitated the reporting process and also provided an 
integral location for reviewing reporting streams” (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 51).  The 
authors go on to state: 
The IHANS alerting system served four roles in NY’s efforts to provide 
situational awareness to external response partners: supporting advance 
preparedness; directly providing event-related content; notifying partners 
of the availability of new (or updates to) analytic products on the 
dashboard system; and notifying both organizations and health officials 
that HERDS surveys had been activated. (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 51)  
The IHANS system provided alerts in advance of the shortage encouraging 
hospitals to prepare for an increase in influenza activity and preparedness 
recommendations, including vaccination recommendations, shortage updates, response 
plans for the state and federal level, influenza activity updates, priority group 
recommendations, and peripheral impacts of the shortage.   
The collaboration dashboard forum provided situational awareness for external 
partners through reports, charts, and graphs developed from data in the HCS data system.  
The dashboard allowed external response partners “to access information related to 
vaccine needs across facility types, vaccine shipments, and allocations within 
jurisdiction” (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 53).  Additionally, customized HERDS data feeds 
were provided through the collaboration dashboard. 
This study concluded, “The presence of an established integrated informatics 
framework for health information exchange and PHEP in New York State conveyed 
significant advantages in advanced preparedness and just-in-time response to this health 
event” (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 53).  The benefits of having such a framework are:  
…a demonstrable state of response readiness; rapid establishment and 
maintenance of situational awareness across response partners through 
just-in-time dynamic information-gathering activities; effective 
communication and coordination of a broad spectrum of response 
activities; rapid development and implementation of data-driven response 
plan.” (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 53)  
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The authors cite specific lessons learned, including: having an established, dual-
use informatics framework optimizes readiness; advantages to the system, such as, 
economy of scale, familiarity, common and standardized usability, depth and breadth of 
partner inclusion and communication; data integration; and new opportunities for 
linkages; systems like HERDS are ideally suited to emergent PHEP events because they 
support rapid, integrated, and flexible deployment of surveys; and involvement of all 
types of health care organizations in information sharing speeds the processing of survey 
and surveillance data (Gotham et al., 2008, p. 54). 
C. AIR SAMPLING AND PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE CASE 
STUDY 
In response to the threats of a naturally emerging or re-emerging infectious 
disease and bioterrorism, the United States and many other countries “have been actively 
seeking means to improve capabilities to detect and respond to biological threats” (IOM 
& NRC, 2011, p. xi).  In an effort to improve the detection of aerosolized biological 
agents, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed and rapidly 
deployed the BioWatch program.  This program is an “environmental monitoring system 
intended to speed detection of specific aerosolized biological agents,” consisting of air 
sampling devices “deployed, primarily in outdoor locations, in more than 30 major urban 
areas” (IOM & NRC, 2011, p. 2).   
The BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance: Evaluating Systems for the Early 
Detection of Biological Threats: Abbreviated Version examines, “the BioWatch program 
and its costs and merits in relation to methods for disease surveillance through the public 
health and health care systems” (IOM & NRC, 2011, p. 1).  In addition to the evaluation, 
it describes “characteristics of an ‘enhanced national surveillance system’ that relies on 
U.S. hospitals and the U.S. public health system;” examines “the costs, merits, and 
capabilities of the current and potential ‘enhanced national surveillance system’ to 
provide a basis for a rapid response to bioterrorist attacks or other biothreats, including 
initiation of pre-infection prophylaxis and expedited response and recovery;” and reaches 
“a conclusion as to whether the two systems are redundant or complementary, both in 
current configuration and potential ‘enhanced’ configuration” (IOM & NRC, 2011, p. 4).   
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BioWatch is a federal program, operated by DHS, which relies upon the 
collaboration with other federal partners, as well as states and localities where the 
BioWatch system is deployed.  Because it relies upon the state or local public health 
system to interpret and respond to BioWatch Actionable Results (BARs), it is necessary 
for it to have an effective relationship with the public health system in the locations 
where it is deployed.  The study notes that “health care providers, laboratories, and health 
departments work together to diagnose disease and recognize outbreaks that require a 
broader response than standard treatment provided for individual, unrelated cases” (IOM 
& NRC, 2011, p. 25).  The intent of the BioWatch system is to provide “earlier warning 
to health departments of the aerosolized release of certain bioterrorism agents so that a 
rapid response can limit morbidity and mortality” (IOM & NRC, 2011, p. 25).      
The public health and healthcare system are highly decentralized and have very 
loose connections.  According to the authors of this study, “neither in public health nor in 
health care is there an overarching national mechanism for unifying or coordinating the 
disparate, and often competing, entities involved” (IOM & NRC, 2011, p. 29).  The 
public health system relies upon private physicians and hospitals to report diseases and 
illnesses for early detection and response.  The authors of this study state “without an 
effective response capability, good surveillance and detection alone can contribute very 
little to limiting morbidity and mortality” (IOM & NRC, 2011, p. 30).  If a BAR is 
detected, the BioWatch system relies upon the public health system to take prompt 
action, such as implementing a prophylaxis campaign.  The study notes that the public 
health and health care system’s confidence in the BioWatch system is critical to success.  
The authors note that public health systems have made significant investments in 
novel and promising surveillance techniques and programs, due in part from funding for 
bioterrorism and public health emergency preparedness.  Despite these investments, the 
authors identified some shortcomings, including: insufficient evidence of the utility of 
novel surveillance techniques; uneven distribution of surveillance capacities; incomplete 
development and uneven implementation of national surveillance standards; inadequate 
attention to useful methods for “linking integrating, analyzing, and displaying multiple 
surveillance platforms for optimal situational awareness, decision making, and response;” 
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and year-to-year federal funding that prevents program planning and deters personnel 
recruitment (IOM & NRC, 2011, p. 91).  In addition, the study notes that there are 
numerous surveillance systems and databases, which have been created in a piecemeal 
fashion over time for tracking specific diseases and conditions or for other purposes.  
“Integrating these across local and state levels would permit greater awareness of patterns 
and trends and increase the likelihood that anomalies” are detected and investigated (IOM 
& NRC, 2011, p. 105). 
Public health and health care systems have been the focus of numerous studies, 
task forces, and commissions.  From these activities, broad themes have emerged and are 
noted in this report.  Some of these themes are: surveillance information sharing needs to 
be improved between the health care system and state and local public health agencies; 
improvement is needed in automated systems used to improve the sharing of surveillance 
information between the health care system and state and local public health agencies; 
and human health information integration with surveillance of animal disease and air and 
water quality—“biosurveillance” (IOM & NRC, 2011, 97). 
The fundamental question, as identified in this study is “whether BioWatch can 
perform in a useful way.”  There have been instances where samples from the BioWatch 
system have produced positive findings that were identified as being genetic material 
from an organism among those currently being monitored.  This has demonstrated that 
the technology can collect “analyzable genetic material and that the current laboratory 
assays can detect this genetic material” (IOM & NRC, 2011, p. 125).  However, through 
the use of traditional surveillance systems, the jurisdictions determined that there had not 
been a terrorist release and there was no indication of increased illness in humans.   
The study committee notes that it “is most confident about the potential for early 
detection via BioWatch to reduce morbidity or mortality in the event of a massive aerosol 
attack using Bacillus (B.) anthracis spores, assuming an effective public health response 
capability is in place” (IOM & NRC, 2011, p. 127).  The study goes on to note that 
although there may be a BAR, “it does not automatically trigger a public health response” 
(IOM & NRC, 2011, p. 128).  The public health response will depend upon the public 
health officials’ interpretation of available traditional surveillance data, the number of 
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BioWatch collectors generating positive results, and follow-up environmental sampling.  
BioWatch is a “narrowly focused” detection tool, “it does not eliminate the need for the 
broad-based surveillance activities that can detect bioterrorism or naturally occurring 
disease outbreaks that BioWatch (enhanced or not) cannot or does not detect” (IOM & 
NRC, 2011, p. 138).  Traditional public health and health care system surveillance and 
BioWatch are complementary. 
Finally, the study notes, “Although the deployment of the BioWatch system has 
been somewhat rocky in terms of coordination and integration with local public health 
officials, there is a continuing national effort to achieve a more integrated system from 
the multitude of local and state systems for infectious disease surveillance” (IOM & 
NRC, 2011, p. 143).  The study notes that the integration of the BioWatch system into 
local surveillance systems, which are integrated into a representative national 
biosurveillance system, will increase the sustainability and effectiveness of the BioWatch 
program. 
D. DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA AND A REAL-
TIME BIOSURVEILLANCE PILOT PROJECT 
The International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) adopted by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) makes it compulsory for member states to meet certain 
requirements and comply with the provisions of the regulation to enhance national, 
regional, and global public health security (Kant & Krishnan, 2010). With India and Sri 
Lanka both being member states of the WHO, they are obligated to have plans of action 
to develop and implement the necessary capabilities to comply with the IHR 2005, 
including the capacity for public health surveillance and response (World Health 
Organization, 2008). 
Both India and Sri Lanka have been working to establish, implement, and operate 
a disease surveillance program, including a biosurveillance program, which meets the 
requirements of the IHR 2005.  Both countries have made significant progress in 
establishing traditional disease surveillance systems and biosurveillance systems.   
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1. India 
India’s constitution provides autonomy to the 28 states within the country. One of 
the responsibilities falling under the state’s purview is health.  Because of this system, 
disease surveillance development and progress throughout India has been varied, with a 
“large number of disease control programmes [sic], each with its own system of data 
gathering.  Historically, these have been vertical programmes [sic]” (Kant & Krishnan, 
2010).  India conducts surveillance on “vector borne infections, diarrhoeal [sic] diseases, 
respiratory diseases, and vaccine preventable diseases,” as well as unusual occurrences 
that may indicate the use of a biological agent (Kant & Krishnan, 2010). 
In 2004, India launched the Integrated Disease Surveillance Project in an attempt 
to bring the disparate disease control programs and data systems into an integrated 
system.  Through this program, India integrated and decentralized its disease surveillance 
activities by establishing surveillance units at the district, state, and national level (Kant 
& Krishnan, 2010).   
This system is predominantly a paper-based system where reports are collected on 
a weekly basis from sub-centers, primary health centers, community health centers, 
hospitals, and laboratories.  These paper reports are received by data managers, who enter 
the data into a Web-based portal where it can be analyzed and disseminated (Kant & 
Krishnan, 2010).  Approximately 850,000 sub-centers and approximately 150,000 
primary health centers, community health centers, and hospitals submit weekly reports on 
syndromes and cases (Kant & Krishnan, 2010).  In addition to traditional surveillance, 
India has a Media Scanning and Verification Cell at the National Centre for Disease 
Control in New Dehli.  According to the study, “This cell collates reported unusual health 
events on infectious diseases within the country and informs the concerned state, district, 
and national level health officials” (Kant & Krishnan, 2010).  Once identified, these 
occurrences are investigated and verified, and communicated to the appropriate 
authorities for further action.  Media scanning increases the sensitivity of India’s official 
surveillance system and has the potential to provide early warning of new disease 
clusters, prior to an official identification and notification. 
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India has made great strides in developing and implementing the infrastructure for 
an integrated disease surveillance and biosurveillance system. However, there are areas 
that still need to be addressed, encouraging private sector reporting, integrating the 
disease surveillance technology with other health programs, improving the media 
scanning and verification process, and having all-inclusive data transmission by including 
mobile, text, voice, e-mail, and fax capabilities (Kant & Krishnan, 2010). 
2. Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka is broken into provinces, districts, and local governments consisting of 
municipal councils, urban councils, and Pradeshiya Sabhas (divisional/rural councils) 
(United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, n.d.).  
Promoting public health is a function of the local government.   
The philosophy and underpinnings of the Sri Lankan disease surveillance system 
dates back to the “Quarantine and Prevention of Diseases Ordinance” introduced by the 
British in 1897 (Waidyanatha, 2010).  It is limited to a handful of notifiable diseases, 
which physicians in the country are required by law to report to public health officials.  
The disease reporting system is predominantly a paper based system with data analysis 
being done at the national level. There are 270 Medical Officers of Health (MOH) in Sri 
Lanka to whom physicians and hospitals report.  Public Health Investigators (PHI) in the 
area will conduct an investigation to either confirm or refute the disease.  On a weekly 
basis, the MOH will complete a weekly return of communicable disease (WRCD) and 
send it to the Epidemiological Unit at the Ministry of Health and a copy to the Regional 
Epidemiologist (Epidemiology Unit, Ministry of Health, 2005).  
In Sri Lanka, there are “separate vertical programmes [sic] to control and monitor 
malaria, filariasis, leprosy, respiratory diseases, human rabies, cancer, HIV/AIDS and 
STDs” (Regional Office for South-East Asia, 2003).  These systems, along with systems 
for specialized disease surveillance operate separately and the data collected within these 
systems is not integrated.   
Sri Lanka has implemented an early warning system to more rapidly identify 
outbreaks of disease so that control measures might be instituted immediately.  In 
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addition to routine reporting of notifiable diseases, Sri Lanka uses: “sentinel surveillance; 
entomological surveillance; news reports and rumour [sic] reports; as well as web 
postings and e-mail alerts” (Regional Office for South-east Asia, 2004). 
Sri Lanka has a robust disease surveillance system, however, those systems are 
not integrated and do not collect information from outpatient departments and clinics, as 
well as the private sector (Regional Office for South-east Asia, 2004).  The potential 
exists for the existing system to be made even stronger by including new data collection 
sources and methodologies and integrating the many vertical disease specific surveillance 
programs, and surveillance for specialized campaigns.    
3. Real-Time Biosurveillance Program in India and Sri Lanka 
The predominantly paper based systems for disease reporting in both India and Sri 
Lanka prohibits timely detection of disease outbreaks and limits the ability of the health 
systems in these countries to effectively respond to and mitigate the disease 
consequences.  In an effort to address this issue, the Real-Time Biosurveillance Program 
(RTBP) was pilot tested in Tamil Nadu, India, and Sri Lanka.  This pilot was an effort to 
bring “modern technology to health departments” to “complement the existing disease 
surveillance and notification systems” (Waidyanatha et al., 2010).   
The pilot included “digitizing all clinical health records and analyzing them in 
near real-time to detect unusual events” (Waidyanatha et al., 2010).  A mobile phone 
application (m-Health Survey) was used to collect patient demographic information, 
disease, or syndrome.  The collected information was transmitted to the “T-Cube Web 
Interface” (TCWI), a Web-based software product using the T-Cube data structure 
(Waidyanatha et al., 2010).  This interface allows for quick retrieval, analysis, and 
display of the collected data.  The pilot also included the “Sahana Messaging/Alerting 
Module,” which was used to disseminate information regarding detected adverse events 
to health officials and workers via SMS, e-mail, and Web (Waidyanatha et al., 2010).  
The alerting module is based upon the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
Public Health Information Network (PHIN) Communication and Alerting Guide (PCA), 
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which provides a “comprehensive set of alerting attributes using Common Alerting 
Protocol (CAP) and Emergency Data Exchange Language” (Waidyanatha et al., 2010).   
The RTBP pilot provided health officials in India and Sri Lanka the ability to 
“detect and monitor a wide variety of health events, involving multiple kinds of diseases, 
including communicable and non-communicable, as well as reportable and non-
reportable diseases” (Waidyanatha et al., 2010).  The overall project proved that mobile 
phone technology (m-Health Survey) is an efficient mechanism for near real-time 
collecting and reporting of disease surveillance data, the T-Cube Web Interface (TCWI) 
was effective for near real-time outbreak detection, and the Sahana Alerting Module was 
effective for the dissemination of real-time health risk information (Waidyanatha et al., 
2010).  Preliminary lessons from the pilot were: 1) “the need for more robust mobile 
application for data collection with complete standardized content in disease-syndrome” 
and 2) “more rigorous capacity building and frequent use is required for health officials 
to take advantage of the full potential of TCWI” (Waidyanatha et al., 2010).    
E. THEORETICAL SENSITIVITY 
Leedy and Ormrod state:  
Qualitative researchers believe that the researcher’s ability to interpret and 
make sense of what he or she sees is critical for understanding any social 
phenomenon.  In this sense, the researcher is an instrument, in much the 
same way that a sociogram, rating scale, or intelligence test is an 
instrument. (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 133)   
Since the author is the instrument in this thesis, it is important to understand the 
origins of her “theoretical sensitivity.”    
“Theoretical sensitivity” as described by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) is “a personal quality of the researcher” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 
42).  This concept is useful when evaluating a researcher’s skill and readiness to conduct 
qualitative research.  Specifically, “it refers to the attribute of having insight, the ability 
to give meaning to data, the capacity to understand, and the capability to separate the 
pertinent from that which is not” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 42).  Strauss and Corbin go 
further to outline sources of theoretical sensitivity, including professional experiences, 
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personal experiences, and review of professional literature.  Experience, such as this, 
lends credibility to the researcher and gives the readers confidence in the researcher’s 
ability to be sensitive to the data and to make appropriate interpretations and decisions 
during analysis.  To characterize the author’s credibility, her experiences are detailed 
below. 
The author has spent her entire professional career, working in some capacity 
with public health surveillance systems.  She has worked with a federal-level hospital 
surveillance system and local level public health surveillance systems, specifically in 
regard to infectious diseases.  The author is an epidemiologist at a regional health 
department, where she has worked for approximately nine years.  A portion of her duties 
involve infectious disease surveillance, investigation, and reporting.  Additionally, the 
author worked as a contract public health analyst at the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, where her job duties were related to program management, development, and 
implementation of segments of a national, voluntary, Web-based hospital surveillance 
program.  Experiences from work in both of these capacities have shaped the author’s 
ideas and beliefs relative to disease surveillance at the organizational, local, state, and 
federal levels. 
Most specifically, the author’s work as an epidemiologist at a regional health 
department has given her ample opportunity to develop opinions and theories related to 
disease surveillance and biosurveillance.  Involvement in local infectious and non-
infectious disease outbreaks as well as those with links to state-wide and national 
outbreaks has helped to shape her theories and opinions in relation to disease surveillance 
capabilities and the need for an integrated national biosurveillance enterprise.  Research 
and the review of relevant literature continue to shape the author’s views of current 
public health surveillance and biosurveillance activities, its shortcomings, and the way to 
the future.   
Daily work within the public health system, as well as contact with the private 
sector, including hospitals, private physicians, and laboratories, has provided the author 
with the unique experience to observe the current uses and limitations of disease 
surveillance and biosurveillance systems.  She has encountered many barriers to 
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information sharing, which will be discussed in this research.  She is intimately familiar 
with the current uses of local public health surveillance systems, and through research 
and interviews, has become much more aware of national level public health surveillance 
and biosurveillance systems.  Through work experience and research, the author has 
formulated and identified many future actions that should be undertaken in order to 
address the shortfalls of existing public health surveillance and biosurveillance systems. 
The authors state, “In a qualitative study, the interpretation of the data will 
inevitably be influenced by the researcher’s biases and values” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, 
p. 151).  Leedy and Ormrod urge the researcher to “minimize the extent to which your 
prior expectations and opinions enter” into the final analysis by collecting “two or more 
different kinds of data” related to the subject (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 151).  The 
author includes both case studies and interviews in the research to ensure an adequate and 
complete analysis related to public health surveillance and biosurveillance capabilities 
and capacities, as well as the need to improve information sharing and for the 
development of an integrated national biosurveillance system.  Case studies related to 
various types of public health and biosurveillance systems were selected, along with 
professionals from various fields who are stakeholders.  This allows for exposure to 
alternative opinions and beliefs and broadens the author’s view of the concepts, issues, 
and challenges.  Furthermore, during the analysis of the case studies and interviews, the 
author made a concerted effort to maintain awareness of her theoretical sensitivities 
through continued reflection upon the data and her analysis of the data, by continually 
questioning what is happening here.  What is the data really saying? What biases may be 
entering into the analysis? This introspective approach is vitally important to retaining 
objectivity in the research, decreasing bias, and conducting a straightforward analysis. 
F. ANALYSIS 
Each of these case studies describes different technologies that are used for 
information sharing to conduct basic disease surveillance, biosurveillance, and to provide 
situational awareness and/or common operating picture.  There are varying levels of 
information sharing between and among the systems that are presently in use, some 
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systems have many connections whereas others do not.  Each system is successful in its 
own right and has some merit for outbreak detection and situational awareness and 
common operating picture. 
Most of the systems reviewed in the case studies provide situational awareness 
but do not facilitate a common operating picture, as evidenced by Table 1. This table 
provides an overview of the systems discussed in each case study and whether it provides 
situational awareness, common operating picture, or both. Of those systems that do 
provide for a common operating picture, it is limited to those who are users or 
contributors to the systems themselves and does not provide a common operating picture 
for those outside the system.  The systems provide a wide range of information from 
over-the-counter medication sales to air monitoring data to traditional disease 
surveillance.  The system described by Public Health Preparedness Informatics 
Infrastructure. A Case Study in Integrated Surveillance and Response: 2004–2005 
National Influenza Vaccine Shortage is a small-scale example of a healthcare/public 
health centric integrated system approach to information sharing for situational awareness 
and common operating picture (Gotham et al., 2008).  This system could serve as a model 
for the initial development and deployment of an integrated national biosurveillance 
system.   
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Patterns emerge when looking at the limitations of the existing systems. Table 2 
identifies the limitations of the existing systems as outlined in the case studies.  Most of 
the limitations to the current systems revolve around systemic issues—the infrastructure, 
or lack thereof; the lack of standard processes and procedures; lack of resources; lack of 
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collaboration and coordination; and a lack of ability to fully use the systems due to lack 
of training or familiarity.  There is still reliance upon paper-based systems and a 
reluctance to move away from that process, as identified in some of the case studies.  The 
case studies also identify issues with improvement efforts, which ultimately create 
problems in other areas within the systems.  These are issues that are common to the 
entire public health and biosurveillance enterprise.   
Issues identified by three of the four case studies are the detection capability, alert 
validity, response, and tracking of cases.  These issues can have a significant impact upon 
the overall success of a biosurveillance system.  If the system is not sensitive enough to 
detect anomalies or the validity of anomaly detection is in question, the system does not 
provide the user with the necessary information to respond to events of public health 
significance.  Nor does it provide a useful mechanism to track cases. 
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Table 2.   Limitations of Current Systems 
 Framework for the 
Development of 
Response Protocols 
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Utility of existing 
systems is limited 
without necessary 
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and methods to 
conduct a 
response 
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capabilities due to 
data 
inconsistencies 
and efforts to 
reduce “noise” 









but not used for 
that purpose 
X    
Table 3 provides a glimpse of the existing barriers to information sharing, which 
inhibits the ability to maintain situational awareness and common operating picture.  The 
issues identified are similar to those cited as limitations, including: lack of collaboration; 
resistance to the systems; lack of knowledge and familiarity with the system; governance 
issues; and organizational and resource issues.  These are common barriers to information 
sharing within any discipline.  The barrier identified in all four case studies is “Scientific 
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and Technical Hurdles.”  For public health surveillance and biosurveillance systems to be 
successful, the users must be familiar with the system and comfortable using it.  
Additionally, the system must generate accurate and useful information, which can be 
applied to the current situation for decision making.  The systems must keep false 
positives to a minimum, as these may desensitize the user to future alerts.  Most 
importantly, the system must be efficient; data entry cannot be time consuming as this is 
a deterrent to use.  These obstacles are not impossible to overcome; however, they might 
be the most important.  Without a strong governance structure, collaboration, knowledge, 
and resources, achieving an integrated national biosurveillance enterprise will be 
difficult. 
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in India and 
Sri Lanka 
Scientific and technical hurdles:  
lack of knowledge of the system, 
laborious and time consuming 
data collection, false-positive 
alerts 
X X X X 
Resistance, organizational, and 
financial obstacles 
X  X  
Although the systems identified in the case studies are used for a variety of 
purposes, the desired end results are detection, mitigation, and prevention of disease or 
illness.  Table 4 identifies the ways that disease surveillance and biosurveillance systems 
in the case studies are used. Functions of the systems ranged from providing analysis, 
visualization, and reporting to early detection and traditional disease surveillance and 
case tracking and follow-up.  Novel uses included administering surveys to existing users 
to provide data for decision making, as well as alerting and situation reporting.  The uses 
outlined in the case studies are reflective of the use of existing systems within the public 




Table 4.   Uses of Current Systems 
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 Framework for the 
Development of 
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for Public Health 
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Surveillance Systems: 
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Sri Lanka 











survey data  
 X  X 
The current systems are used for a wide variety of purposes; however numerous 
further actions or steps can be taken to improve the existing systems.  Table 5 outlines 
further actions needed to improve the systems, as outlined in the case studies.  The 
primary themes, which emerge are the need for evaluation and testing; protocols; daily 
use of the systems; coordination and integration; and resource availability and a 
competent workforce.  Many of the issues for further action address the systemic issues 
identified in the case studies.  Systemic issues are often difficult to change because it 
requires fundamental changes to the existing philosophies and culture within a system.  
Standardization of the evaluation and response protocols are important if an 
integrated national biosurveillance system is the desired end result.  Having standards 
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allows for disparate systems to be integrated so that data can be compared to create 
situational awareness and common operating picture.  Additionally, having a trained 
cadre of professionals using the systems increases the reliability and validity of the 
outputs, thereby improving the overall situational awareness and common operating 
picture generated by the system.      
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Table 5.   Further Actions to Improve Systems 
 Framework for the 
Development of 
Response Protocols 
for Public Health 
Syndromic 
Surveillance Systems: 
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X X X  
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 Framework for the 
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for Public Health 
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These case studies describe successful information sharing across jurisdictions 
and sectors, at times for rapid detection, but more often to provide varying levels of 
situational awareness and common operating picture.  However, they note that there are 
barriers to information sharing and that there is room for improvement in disease 
surveillance and biosurveillance systems that currently exist.  Recommendations include 
standardization of systems and protocols, training, collaboration, coordination, and 
information sharing.  Each system relies upon connections to other systems and 
stakeholders in order to achieve the highest level of situational awareness and common 
operating picture.  This reinforces the idea that integration is necessary for more rapid 
detection of naturally occurring or intentional disease outbreaks and to create better 




IV. INTERVIEWS AND ANALYSIS 
Interviews of experts in the field of public health and biosurveillance were 
conducted.  These experts practice in the fields of academia, public health, and homeland 
security.  Each interviewee had a different professional background; however, they have 
experience with public health surveillance and biosurveillance in some capacity.  Tables 
are used to provide a mechanism for easy visualization and comparison of the interview 
responses. The tables do not represent specific questions and the responses to those 
questions; rather they represent overarching themes that emerged during the interview 
process.  The interview questions were to serve as merely a guide to the discussion.  The 
analysis of these interview responses resulted in similar themes emerging, as can be seen 
in the following tables and accompanying analysis.  
The open-ended nature of the interview questions afforded ample opportunity for 
discussion related to the health and medical enterprise and information sharing.  The 
initial discussion revolved around existing systems and how they were used.  As 
evidenced in Table 6, there are a multitude of systems at the local, state, and federal level 
with various missions.  They range from traditional disease surveillance activities to early 
detection and notification or communication.  Each interviewee had different experiences 
with various systems, as illustrated in Table 6.  The interviewees stated there was no way 
to discuss or even mention the majority of the systems as there were far too many, each 
with a distinct purpose and function.  This in and of itself is part of the challenge 
associated with information sharing and with creating an integrated national 
biosurveillance system—there are so many systems that exist and serve a variety of 
functions, all operated by different entities, who are not always willing to share 
information with others for various reasons. 
A. CURRENT SYSTEMS AND THEIR USE 
The majority of the systems today function as traditional disease surveillance and 
reporting systems.  As noted by both the public health and homeland security 
professionals, Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention have numerous systems that function in the traditional disease surveillance 
capacity, as well as some form of biosurveillance.  Most of the systems listed below 
(Table 6) are local, state, or federal systems that exist independently and have a single 
mission, although, systems such as BioSense and Fluview have more of a biosurveillance 
focus.  After the events of 9/11, early detection, biosurveillance, and the need for 
integration of response and information sharing became significant.  The use of the 
Incident Command System within the public health and medical arena is a relatively new 
phenomenon but has been successful in integrating the public health and medical 
enterprise response with traditional first response agencies.  It has facilitated and 
improved information sharing between all agencies involved.   
Table 6.   Current Systems and Their Use 
 Public Health Academia Homeland Security 
For integration of 
response and 
information sharing 
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no data access 
 Health and Human 
Services has 
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in place for disease 
surveillance 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The discussion of current systems and their use initiated a discussion of the 
limitations of current systems (Table 7).  Common themes emerged, as many of the 
limitations were identified by each of the professional groups interviewed.  The primary 
issues cited during the interviews centered on the numerous systems, which gather a 
variety of data; the lack of overall guidance and standards for those systems and their 
development; and the absence of integration of the information from the various systems.  
Furthermore, the interviewees discussed the fact that many of our systems are balkanized, 
still collecting data, and communicating on paper.  The existing systems, including 
syndromic surveillance systems were developed with little forethought and planning and 
have no standards related to the systems, analysis, or reporting of the data.  The public 
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health interviewees also noted the fact that there is currently no common operating 
picture where all information can be visualized on one platform.  The ad hoc 
development of many of the existing systems has led many to question the utility of the 
systems.  The interviewees also pointed out that all of the data for these systems is 
generated at the local level and that any system is only as good as the data entered by 
those at the local level, whether it is the hospital, laboratory, or health department.    





Numerous systems and entities are collecting data, all are 
collecting various types of data, they all generate a different 
picture, and none are connected or integrated. 
X X X 
Systems were designed with no guidance and standards. 
Lacking a well-defined mission and no standards for 
definitions, user access, data ownership, or information 
sharing. 
X X X 
Syndromic Surveillance—questionable utility, especially at a 
national level.  Will not be the first indication of an outbreak.
X  X 
Current systems are balkanized. They have limited access, 
are limited by data gathered, including local reporting 
capacity, laboratory testing capacity, and response capacity 
X X  
No national system in place to advance the state of 
knowledge on surveillance and biosurveillance through 
funding,  researching, and sharing best practices  
X X  
No common operating picture where all information can be 
visualized on one platform  
X   
Still paper-based with communication up the chain and the 
distillation of pertinent information to make informed 










Usefullness decreases if others try to interpret the public 




Early event detection has been incorporated into 
biosurveillance systems in an ad hoc way resulting in 
questionable results.  
 X  
Outbreak detection is about the phone call.  It is about 
relationships and a network. The systems support detection. 
X   
C. BARRIERS 
Many of the challenges faced by those conducting disease surveillance and 
biosurveillance activities stem from difficulties obtaining the needed information or from 
the lack of availability of the needed information.  Barriers to information sharing were 
discussed at length during the interview process and the common themes are detailed in 
Table 8.  System design and development was identified by all three professional groups 
as a barrier to information sharing.  This issue was identified earlier in the Table 7 as 
well. Another systemic issue, identified during the interview process, is the weak public 
health surveillance infrastructure; poor ground-level surveillance and reporting; and 
limited laboratory capacity.  This may be a direct result of another barrier cited by the 
interviewees, funding, and resource challenges.  Because of funding and resource 
challenges, it is difficult to build and maintain the infrastructure for information sharing.  
Other barriers mentioned during the interviews included legal and institutional barriers, 
such as HIPAA, technological barriers, the resistance of states to requirements on disease 
surveillance and reporting being imposed by the federal government, and the “culture of 
information sharing” or the lack of willingness to share information.  The willingness to 
share information is an important aspect to establishing situational awareness and 
common operating picture and is a continued challenge faced by many sectors. 
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Separate and independent development and evolution of 
surveillance systems creates inability for systems to share 
information 
X X X 
Weak public health surveillance infrastructure - Poor 
ground-level surveillance and reporting and limited 
laboratory capacity for diagnostic testing 
X  X 
Funding and resource challenges make it difficult to build 
and maintain infrastructure 
X  X 
Health data privacy (HIPAA) and other legal and 
institutional restrictions are an impediment to information 
sharing and research 
 X  
Technological barriers X   
States’ resistance to the federal government imposing 
requirements on disease surveillance and reporting 
X   
“Culture of Information Sharing”—lack of willingness to 
share information—including data, types of systems, contact 
  X 
D. IMPROVING INFORMATION SHARING 
Since information sharing is the basis for effective biosurveillance initiatives, it is 
imperative that there are few impediments to the process.  There are many barriers, as 
noted above; however, the interviewees had many suggestions to improve information 
sharing (Table 9).  One of the most promising initiatives is the move to electronic health 
records, health information exchanges, and meaningful use.3  These three initiatives are 
                                                 
3 “The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 specifies three main components of 
Meaningful Use: 1) The use of a certified Electronic Health Record (EHR) in a meaningful manner, such as 
e-prescribing. 2) The use of certified EHR technology for electronic exchange of health information to 
improve quality of health care. 3) The use of certified EHR technology to submit clinical quality and other 
measures. Simply put, “meaningful use" means providers need to show they're using certified EHR 
technology in ways that can be measured significantly in quality and in quantity”.  “CMS HER Meaningful 
Use Overview” Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
https://www.cms.gov/EHRIncentivePrograms/30_Meaningful_Use.asp. 
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the most promising steps toward the ability to have a truly integrated national 
biosurveillance system.  These initiatives could establish a strong foundation for an 
integrated national biosurveillance system to build upon.  This may also enable all of the 
parts of the surveillance system to work together, as noted by the interviewees, in a more 
efficient and effective way.  Another important aspect that is mentioned in the literature 
and by the homeland security interviewee is the need for federal leadership.  This is an 
extremely important aspect of the overall planning, design, and implementation of an 
integrated national biosurveillance system.  The federal leadership can provide 
prioritization, an overarching organizational strategy and direction, as well as enforce the 
legislation pertinent to an integrated national biosurveillance system.  The federal leaders 
must also address policy issues related to information sharing so that it does not continue 
to be seen as a barrier to information sharing between and among various agencies and 
jurisdictions.  Given that most traditional disease surveillance data comes from the local 
level, which is then transmitted to the state and then federal level, the interviewees noted 
that the systems must be useful to states.  Local and state agencies may be much more 
willing to allow information from their systems to be integrated into a larger national 
system if the overall system is useful for the local and state purposes as well.     





New technologies—electronic health records, health 
information exchanges, meaningful use 
X X X 
All parts of the surveillance system needs to work together X X  
Generate stakeholder buy-in and partnership through 
involvement in development and planning. 
X   
Prioritize activities by addressing one initiative at a time X   
Create systems that are useful for states X   
Training and capacity building to address poor 
surveillance and reporting 






Need federal leadership to organize the strategy, provide 
direction,  and enforce the existing legislative mandates 
  X 
Lab Specimen Collection, Submission, and Testing 
Capacity 
X   
Policy gets in the way   X 
E. IMPROVING EXISTING SYSTEMS 
Not only did the interviewees discuss ways to improve information sharing, a 
large amount of the discussion focused upon ways to improve the existing systems (Table 
10).  Existing disease surveillance and biosurveillance systems are the foundation for an 
integrated national biosurveillance system; therefore, it is vitally important that these 
systems function at the highest level possible. Much of the suggestions for improvement 
revolve around developing a solid foundation, building capacity, training, and 
collaboration.  All three professional groups interviewed noted the importance of building 
a solid foundation for biosurveillance, situational awareness, and common operating 
picture through a well-defined mission, definitions, and standards.  They also thought it 
was important to conduct basic research relative to the existing systems, including 
capabilities, best practices, and opportunities for development of new methods to gather 
data and information.  Two of the three professional groups interviewed identified the 
need to build capacity at the local level for surveillance through funding, 
training/workforce development, staff retention, partnerships, and further development of 
system capacity. One of the most fundamental ways to build capacity outside of the 
actual system is through training and workforce development.  The interviewees noted 
that reporting within and across agencies could be improved through education and 
training of end-users and legislators about disease surveillance, reporting, functionality of 
existing systems, the statistical processes that drive the data analysis, information sharing 
practices, and the HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996) 
law.  Other actions that the interviewees noted were the need for collaboration and 
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stakeholder buy-in.  This, as discussed during the interviews, can be achieved by 
involving the stakeholders in the planning and development phases of systems or of an 
integrated national system, as well as generating a common understanding of the need for 
information sharing and the overall purpose of a national common operating picture and 
situational awareness.  
Policy change was also mentioned during the interview process.  Policy change is 
a challenging subject, but it is a necessary discussion in regard to creating an integrated 
national biosurveillance system.  The homeland security professional noted the fact that 
there is a disconnection between the operations (the field) and policymakers.  This makes 
policy change difficult because those who are making policy do not necessarily 
understand the operations of the systems.  Additionally, the HIPAA law and other health 
information safeguards were mentioned as areas where policy change or other actions 
might improve information sharing.  Federal government involvement with policy 
change, enforcing policies, and legislative mandates was noted as a needed action to 
improve the overall enterprise. 





Develop a solid foundation for biosurveillance, situational 
awareness, and common operating picture with a well 
defined mission, definitions and standards: define terms, 
case definitions, data needs, software needs, infrastructure 
etc. 
X X X 
Investments in basic research to identify capabilities of 
existing systems, best practices, develop basic biosurveillance 
capabilities, and identify opportunities for development of 
new methods to gather data and information. 
X X X 
Build capacity at the local level for surveillance through 
funding, training/workforce development, staff retention, 
partnerships, and further development of system capacity. 






Improve reporting within and across agencies through 
education and training about disease surveillance, reporting, 
functionality of existing systems, and statistical processes 
X X  
Build upon existing systems at the state and local level and 
platforms to integrate information, not specifically data—to 
progressively move those systems into a Common Operating 
Picture framework. 
X X  
Integration is difficult.  Requires time and manpower to pull 
all the systems together and to ensure that an appropriate 
mix and separation exist. 
X  X 
Generate stakeholder buy-in of public and private agencies 
and organizations through involvement in development and 
planning, creating a willingness to  participate and 
collaborate for data sharing and integration 
X  X 
Expand access to local systems and identify appropriate 
“levels of access to data” 
X  X 
Systems can be improved  to better manage and visualize the 
data, including the ability to visualize the entire scope of a 
patient visit, including emergency department information, 
pharmacy data, outpatient visits, imaging orders and results, 
X  X 
Legislation must provide financial incentives to improve 
surveillance capacities and to share information 
X  X 
Address data and health information-sharing safeguards and 
obstacles that hinder the development of a national system, 
including incentivizing information sharing and cooperation 
among and between agencies. 
 X X 
Education and training for policy makers and end-users on 
system operations and needs; information-sharing practices, 










Develop a shared understanding of needed information for 
biosurveillance, the means through which that information 
can be shared, the overall purpose of a national system and 
the purpose of national situational awareness and common 
operating picture. 
X  X 
Review and identify lessons learned from literature and the 
experiences in other fields such as the Department of 
Defense (definition of situational awareness) and Private 
Industry (Statistical Process Control Methods). 
 X  
No comprehensive listing of existing systems in the U.S. A 
federal effort to create a federal interagency registry of 
systems that includes point of contact information, system 
goal, type of data collected, would allow for a network to be 
established to integrate systems. 
  X 
Need federal leadership to organize the strategy, provide 
direction, maintain and/or increase funding, and enforce the 
existing legislative mandates 
  X 
Establish or enforce laws that require reporting from 
physicians, long term care facilities, health departments and 
schools 
X   
Policy change is difficult because of the disconnection 
between operations and the policy makers. 
  X 
F. STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
Standards were discussed at length by all interviewees.  The common themes are 
described in Table 11.  There is an immense need for the development of standards 
related to many aspects of information sharing, disease surveillance, and biosurveillance. 
According to the interviewees, standards are the basic foundation of the entire disease 
surveillance and biosurveillance enterprise.  There is a need for standard definitions for 
situational awareness, “syndromes,” biosurveillance, and “cases.”  The interviewees also 
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note the need for informatics standards, data and information exchange standards, coding 
standards, detection algorithms, and roles and responsibilities for users.  Standards 
development is the cornerstone of the success of an integrated national biosurveillance 
system.  There should be standards across disciplines and systems so that the information 
contained within disparate systems can be merged to create an overall common operating 
picture and situational awareness at all levels.  





Informatics standards should be developed along with 
the tool 
X  X 
Data/information exchange standards X  X 
Coding standards, reporting standards, standard case 
definitions 
X  X 
Standard definitions for biosurveillance  X X 
Standard definitions for “syndromes” in syndromic 
surveillance 
 X X 
Standard detection algorithms  X  
Define situational awareness  X X 
Define standards for system access and control  X X 
Roles and responsibilities at different levels should be 
identified and defined 
  X 
G. LEVELS OF ACCESS 
In line with defining roles and responsibilities of those using the system, it is also 
important to set standards that define the levels of access for users, particularly in regard 
to an integrated national biosurveillance system.  Table 12 shows the common themes 
related to levels of access.  The overall consensus of the group is that access and 
permissions should be role based.  The professional groups also identified issues with 
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system access, including privacy issues, too many people with access allows for 
information to be spread too widely, and the fact that the more access that is granted the 
more complicated the system becomes.  This is a justification for role based permissions 
and limiting access to aggregate data for those who are outside of the agency that owns 
the data or do not have a need to know.  Protecting the information contained within the 
various systems is paramount in creating a culture of trust between the agencies that are 
providing data. 





Access and permissions should be role based X X X 
Yes, aggregate information.  Not to specific patient 
information 
X   
Granting access to all levels is good for situational 
awareness but can cause issues if information is spread 
too widely. 
X   
Access to all levels would be nice but not sure it is 
feasible, may be privacy issues. 
 X  
The more access you allow the more complicated the 
system becomes and  it becomes more difficult to 
manage the users within the system 
 X  
H. INTEGRATION OF CURRENT SYSTEMS 
As noted previously, there are numerous systems that exist at all levels—private 
sector, local, state, and federal.  This section discusses the total integration of all of these 
existing systems and their information to improve information sharing across 
jurisdictions for rapid detection, situational awareness, and common operating (Table 
13).  This integration would essentially create a “system of systems” to establish an 
integrated national biosurveillance system.  All of the professionals interviewed had 
differing viewpoints as to whether the systems could be integrated and what is needed to 
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accomplish the integration.  Some of the interviewees identified reasons as to why the 
integration would not be possible or why integration would not be useful.  Overall, for 
systems to be integrated there must be a leader, a well-defined mission, stakeholder 
involvement, and they must meet the needs of all levels of players from the national to 
the local level.  One “system in the sky” will not work; however, data needs to be 
gathered electronically and the ability to analyze the data at all levels is important so that 
various operating pictures can be developed based upon need. 





Missions must be well-defined X   
CDC should take a leadership role X   
Get stakeholders involved X   
Need a comprehensive operating picture across the 
board, not just certain programs within CDC working 
independently. 
X   
Would work at the national level but players at all levels 
have access and it is useful to meet their needs and can 
meet national needs. 
 X  
Having a “system of systems” that would collect 
information from various existing systems to establish a 
national picture makes sense 
 X  
A “system in the sky” that does everything will not 
work 
 X  
Information should be gathered electronically 
(automated push and pull from all levels), cannot rely 
upon the provider to enter and move data. 
  X 
Must be a way to get the broader picture and scale it 
down to the level needed 






Make tools available to analyze local data and interact 
around local data. 
  X 
I. INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL SYSTEMS AND ONE PRIMARY 
COLLECTOR 
There are numerous national systems that gather data and information from local 
and state agencies, as well as the private sector.  This section discusses the integration of 
the existing national systems and the information contained within those to create an 
integrated national biosurveillance system.  This integration would in essence create a 
“system of systems” from all existing national systems.  The interviewees were asked 
their opinion as to whether the existing national systems could be integrated to form 
national biosurveillance system (Table 14).  The consensus of the professionals 
interviewed was that it would be great if an integrated national biosurveillance system 
could be created; however, most national systems were not designed for integration; 
therefore, an integrated national system did not seem possible.  Conversely, one public 
health professional did note that there is a possibility for some national systems, such as 
NNDSS, PulseNet, and FoodNet, could be integrated because they are already linked in 
some fashion through the current reportable disease systems.  In this discussion, one 
professional identified the need for federal leadership for the national biosurveillance 
project.  






Most existing national systems are not useful, not 
designed for integration and what value would a 










Very far away from an integrated system—not sure an 
integrated national system is possible 
 X X 
A national picture is not going to help with state 
situational awareness because states already have their 
own data to create situational awareness.   
X   
In a sense, existing state surveillance systems’ data are 
integrated with the National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System (NNDSS); it’s just not near real-
time. 
X   
Definitely think so—systems such as NNDSS, PulseNet, 
FoodNet, are already linked in some fashion through 
the reportable disease system and have the ability to 
identify national-level outbreaks and unusual cases.   
X   
Would be great if a national system could be created  X  
A “system of systems” sounds good but individual 
systems have difficulty operating, this compounds with 
a “system of systems”. 
  X 
No leader to lead the effort for biosurveillance 
integration. 
  X 
As with the responses to whether the existing national systems could be 
integrated, the interviewees had mixed opinions as to whether one existing national 
system could serve as a primary collector.  Table 15 shows the responses from each 
professional group.  No one could identify a single national system, with the exception of 
the homeland security professional, that might serve as the primary collector of 
biosurveillance data.  This interviewee stated that the National Biosurveillance 
Integration Center was supposed to be the integrated national biosurveillance system.  
They went on to state that this center is not working well as a “system of systems” 
because it has difficulty obtaining needed data.  This was an issue also identified 
throughout much of the literature.  Overall, the interviewees could not conceptualize an 
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all-encompassing system or a one-stop shop.  However, they did offer ways to possibly 
achieve integration, including maintaining individual system integrity, building capacity, 
and a map and master plan that details the end result. 





As the primary collector from all sources?  No, an all-
encompassing system seems too overwhelming. 
X   
Cannot conceptualize having a one-stop shop. X   
It is possible will take building over time. X   
Maintain individual system integrity but feed the 
overall system. 
X   
Complicated but doable. X   
Build capacity in small ways to get to the bigger picture. X   
To have an integrated national biosurveillance system 
you need a map and a master plan that details the end 
result. 
X   
Difficult to develop because of changes in leadership 
and priorities. 
X   
Not familiar with one—BioSense or ESSENCE might 
serve as the basic foundation for a national system. 
 X  
So far away from that.  People have tried to use one 
system and it did not work. 
  X 
National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) is 
supposed to be an integrated national biosurveillance 
system—does not work well as a “system of systems” 
  X 
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J. BENEFITS OF AN INTEGRATED NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE 
SYSTEM 
Even though the professionals who were interviewed could not identify one 
system, nor were they sure that one system could be the primary collector of information 
from the various systems nationwide, they did see some benefit to an integrated national 
biosurveillance system.  The primary benefit stated by two of the three professional 
groups is the fact that presently no national picture exists.  An integrated national 
biosurveillance system would be beneficial for creating a common operating picture and 
situational awareness; however, they stated it could not be used as an early event 
detection and warning system.  As noted in Table 16, the phone call at the local level is 
still the best early warning and notification system and nothing will replace that.  The 
interviewees also stated reasons that an integrated national system would not be 
beneficial.  The public health professionals indicated that a national system would only 
be beneficial if managed and owned by public health because other sectors had differing 
priorities and requirements.  The public health professionals also stated that there is not 
always a need for integrated data.  Some systems are designed to be separate and have 
specific missions.  Although the public health professionals did not see a need for all data 
to be integrated, they did state that national systems and initiatives have a place.  
However, as stated in regard to other questions, there must be national priorities and 
planning accompanying the national initiatives. 





Currently no national picture exists, would be beneficial for 
creating common operating picture and situational 
awareness but not for early event detection and warning. 
X X  
National systems and initiatives have a place but there 









A national system is only beneficial if managed and owned 
by public health because of differing priorities and 
requirements 
X   
Depends upon the interpretation of integration.  Not always 
a need for integrated data, some systems are designed to be 
separate. Systems have separate missions—reportable 
diseases, syndromic surveillance, immunization registries, 
etc. 
X   
K. ROADMAP FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
A roadmap for implementation is one method for establishing national priorities 
and planning for an integrated national biosurveillance system.  The interviewees were 
asked if they were familiar with a roadmap for implementation of an integrated national 
biosurveillance system.  Their responses are shown in Table 17.  The professionals had 
various answers, all of which pertained to federal legislation or initiatives.  Two 
professionals stated that there probably was but that they were not aware of any.  These 
statements reinforce the earlier statements regarding the need for federal leadership and a 
roadmap or national priorities and planning. 






The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
(PAHPA) was the initial roadmap or plan. 
X   
The National Response Framework (NRF) from an overall 
preparedness standpoint. 
X   
National Biosurveillance Strategy X   






Probably is but I am not aware of any. X X  
Department of Homeland Security is working on a 
strategy for the National Biosurveillance Integration 
Center (NBIC) 
  X 
L. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The creation of a conceptual model for an integrated national biosurveillance 
system is one way to meet the need for a roadmap and national priorities and planning 
(Table 18).  Many of the professionals interviewed felt that a conceptual model would be 
useful in giving a roadmap for implementation, including establishing governance, roles 
and responsibilities, and accountability.  It allows for stakeholder involvement in the 
planning process through dialogue.  Challenges to the development of a conceptual 
model were also identified.  These included the sheer challenge of developing a model, 
the past issues with developing organizational models, and the fact that many agencies 
are reluctant to work within a network.  The homeland security professional also offered 
two ways to look at a conceptual model, as one that shows all the information flowing up 
before it flows over or as a true network that allows for multiple actions simultaneously.  
Overall, the responses were positive that a conceptual model for an integrated national 
biosurveillance system would be useful in the overall development of the system. 






It is critical—must establish governance and roles and 
responsibilities, and accountability 
X   
Use a community planning model to generate stakeholder 
involvement and outline roles and responsibilities 
 






Stakeholder involvement in the planning process is important 
for building capacity 
X   
Helps identify leadership, to organize initiatives, and how the 
initiatives are defined and implemented 
X   
Yes on a number of levels 1) research benefits in describing the 
model; 2) allows assessment of system and process; 3)  allows 
dialogue to occur between stakeholders 
 X  
Gives a roadmap for implementation  X  
Allows for planning to accomplish goals  X  
Gives an overall process for the system.  X  
People have been trying to come up with a model for quite 
some time.  Has encountered problems. 
  X 
Some have suggested that the system exist outside of any 
federal agency to avoid “ownership” issues. 
  X 
Issue is most agencies want to be autonomous.   X 
Having a diagram sounds good but getting there is challenging.   X 
Two ways to look at the diagram: 1) it is a diagram of 
everything flowing “up” in an agency and then over; or 2) it is 
a network that allows multiple actions at the same time. 
  X 
Agencies tend to be very hierarchical and cannot share 
information until the Secretary knows about it. 
  X 
At network is much stronger but people are reluctant to work 
in that environment. 
  X 
There are various systems today that cover a range of missions, which include: 
traditional disease surveillance, early detection, situational awareness, notification, 
communication, integration of response and information sharing, and laboratory 
surveillance.  They are all beneficial in their own right; however, there are ways in which 
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the systems and the overall practice of information sharing could be improved.  The 
interview process generated numerous recommendations for improvement for existing 
systems, including standard development and policy change.  The lack of standards and 
the challenges associated with existing policies were discussed as barriers to the overall 
process of information sharing, specifically where health data privacy is concerned.  The 
overall consensus of those who were interviewed is that an integrated national 
biosurveillance system might be beneficial, if the federal government will take the lead in 






There is a substantial amount of discussion and some effort within the public 
health and medical enterprise in the United States and worldwide regarding ways to 
improve information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors to rapidly detect and 
respond to naturally occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or exposures and to create 
better situational awareness and a common operating picture.  Information sharing, 
specifically related to the public health and medical enterprise, is imperative for rapid 
detection and response to outbreaks and is the cornerstone of the establishment of 
situational awareness and common operating picture.  Therefore, creating a mechanism to 
achieve that end is necessary, as identified in much of the literature related to homeland 
security and health security. 
The findings in this study reinforced many of the gaps discovered in the review of 
the literature.  Specifically, that there is no overarching roadmap for improving 
information sharing, there is no process for creating an integrated national biosurveillance 
system, the existing organizational structure does not facilitate collaboration between 
existing entities nor the integration of existing systems, and no entity has been identified 
to lead the activities related to creating an integrated national biosurveillance system.  
These findings along with others from both the case studies and the interviews will be 
expanded upon in this chapter. 
Categories were created during the analysis of the case studies and interviews, 
which relate back to the research questions.  This chapter will be structured around the 
research questions and the findings will be discussed using the categories developed in 
the analysis chapters. This research had one primary research question with three sub-
questions.  The sub-questions are answered first, with the primary research question 
being discussed last in the chapter, as this provides a summation of the findings from the 
sub-questions.   
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A. CURRENT SYSTEMS AND THEIR USE 
What systems are currently used to provide situational awareness and a common 
operating picture, during naturally occurring or intentional disease outbreaks, or 
exposures and what are the current limitations of these systems? 
The primary use of most of the systems that exist today is detection, mitigation, 
and prevention of disease or illness.  Other uses of the systems that are noted in the case 
studies and interviews are analysis, visualization, reporting, early detection, traditional 
disease surveillance, case tracking and follow-up, notification, and communication.  Most 
of the systems studied provide situational awareness; very few are identified to provide a 
common operating picture.  The use of the incident command system was noted in the 
interviews as being successful in improving information sharing for common operating 
picture and situational awareness between agencies through integrating the public health 
and medical enterprise response with traditional first response agencies.  The interviews 
and case studies demonstrated that there are numerous systems that exist at the local, 
state, and national level, many of which function independently and have a single 
mission.  Most of these systems are limited to functioning in a traditional disease 
surveillance role, and a few provide some form of biosurveillance. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The fact that there are so many systems that collect a wide variety of data is a 
limitation that was identified during the interviews.  In the public health and medical 
enterprise, there are systems that exist in the private sector, at local health departments, 
regional health departments, state health departments, the federal level, and other private 
sector entities.  These systems collect and process a wide range of data from various 
sources, including syndromic surveillance data, over-the-counter pharmacy sales, 
immunization records, communicable disease reports, laboratory test results, patient 
encounters, insurance data, etc.  Many of the existing systems are balkanized, 
compartmentalizing the data collected and generally not sharing outside of the systems. 
This compartmentalization of systems greatly impedes the information-sharing process.   
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Presently, many public health reportable disease systems are still somewhat paper-based 
systems, with data collection primarily relying upon faxed reports from physicians’ 
offices and laboratories.  
It is also noted throughout the literature, case studies, and interviews that the local 
level is the primary collector of data and because of that, the systems are limited to the 
quality and quantity of data collected and entered at the local level. There was little 
forethought put into the development and design of many of the existing systems in terms 
of standardized data structures and interoperable application level programming; 
therefore, the system infrastructure limits the overall ability of those systems to share 
information to create a common operating picture and situational awareness.  A general 
lack of data collection and information-sharing infrastructure and methods to conduct a 
response was also identified as a limitation.  This stems partly from a lack of 
collaboration in the planning, development, and use of the existing data collection and 
information-sharing systems.  The lack of collaboration is a significant barrier, noted in 
many different areas of the case studies and interviews, including as being a limitation to 
the existing systems as well as a barrier to information sharing. 
C. BARRIERS TO INFORMATION SHARING 
What are the barriers to information sharing in the current public health/medical 
enterprise? 
There are numerous barriers that were identified in the literature, case studies, and 
interviews.  The broad categories that emerged were the issues related to privacy of 
personally identifiable health information; the information-sharing culture; scientific and 
technical barriers; data collection issues; and organizational and financial barriers.   
1. Information Privacy/Information-Sharing Culture 
The analysis of the interviews illustrated that there is a general reluctance in the 
public health and medical enterprise to share data and information between and among 
jurisdictions because of the fear of a health data privacy violation.  Stemming, in part, 
from fears of health data privacy violations, a “culture” of information sharing has 
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developed, meaning the lack of willingness to share information between and among 
entities and jurisdictions.  In addition to the fears, the interviews noted a general lack of 
understanding or knowledge within the health and medical enterprise related to health 
data privacy legislation, such as the HIPAA law.  
2. Scientific and Technical Barriers 
Scientific and technical hurdles are identified as a primary barrier to information 
sharing, including system design, lack of knowledge of existing systems, and resistance 
to new systems or to new system integration efforts.  The interviews and case studies 
noted that there are few people who know how to adequately use the existing systems or 
those who use the systems are not adequately trained to use them.  Lastly, there is a 
general resistance to the development of new systems or to efforts to integrate the 
existing systems.  The interviews noted that the resistance to new systems and to 
integration efforts may originate from the states’ desire to retain their Tenth Amendment 
power for public health law, including their desire to not have disease surveillance and 
reporting requirements imposed upon them by the federal government.    
3. Data Collection 
Data collection was identified as a barrier to information sharing for a number of 
reasons, including the fact that it is laborious and time-consuming, and often generates 
false-positive alerts. Specifically in regard to systems that are still predominantly paper-
based, data collection requires phone calls and faxes to and from various entities within 
the public health and medical enterprise. Once this data is received, it must then be 
manually entered into an electronic system before it can be shared efficiently with other 
entities. Additionally, the overall public health surveillance infrastructure is weak, 
primarily because of poor ground-level surveillance, limited epidemiological capacity, 
and limited laboratory capacity.     
4. Organizational/Financial Obstacles 
Organizational obstacles and financial obstacles are also noted as significant 
barrier to information sharing.  The interviewees stated that organizations may be 
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reluctant to share the data that they collect.  There are many reasons for this, including 
the fear of identifying deficiencies or weaknesses within private sector facilities or for 
fear of releasing proprietary information.  Moreover, organizations may have internal 
restrictions related to information sharing, to protect from health data privacy violations.   
In the past few years, funding for the development and maintenance of disease 
surveillance and biosurveillance systems has been decreasing, as noted during the 
interviews.  Due to the funding decreases, these systems may not have been upgraded to 
meet interoperability standards or there may not be enough funding to maintain 
appropriately trained staff to use the system.    
D. IMPROVING EXISTING SYSTEMS 
How can the current systems be used, and what further actions can be taken to 
more rapidly detect and respond to outbreaks and to create better situational awareness 
and a common operating picture? 
Existing disease surveillance and biosurveillance systems are the foundation for 
an integrated national biosurveillance system and improvements to those systems are 
needed so that they function at the highest level.  As such, the overall analysis revealed 
that developing a solid foundation for disease surveillance and biosurveillance systems, 
through leadership, standardization, and building local capacity, is crucial to improving 
information sharing.  This includes the identification or creation of definitions, standards, 
a well-defined mission, well-defined data needs, software requirements, and 
infrastructure.  Having a solid foundation for disease surveillance and biosurveillance 
systems provides a mechanism for the production and sharing of high-quality data and 
information, thereby adding value to the existing systems and potentially reducing the 
stakeholders’ reluctance to share information and to the potential integration of systems.  
Additionally, building local capacity for disease surveillance and biosurveillance via 
training and stakeholder collaboration is key in optimizing such systems and emerged as 




analyzing the case studies that included mechanisms to achieve these improvements—
evaluation and testing, protocols, daily use, stakeholder coordination and partnerships, 
resource availability, and a competent workforce.   
1. Leadership 
Federal leadership was identified as a mechanism to improve existing systems.  
This leadership, as noted in the interviews, includes strategy development that provides 
organization and direction; stakeholder education; policy development, policy change, 
and enforcement. 
a. Strategy 
The interviewees noted that there are some strategies that exist in regard to 
information sharing for improving situational awareness and common operating picture, 
such as the PAHPA and the National Biosurveillance Strategy.  However, two of the 
professionals stated, in regard to strategies to improve information sharing, that there 
“probably was but they were not aware of any.”  The strategies that were mentioned were 
federal-level initiatives that had not had overwhelming success in setting a path for 
achieving information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors to achieve situational 
awareness and common operating picture.  An overall strategy for information sharing, as 
discussed in the interviews, is a mechanism that could provide clear guidance, 
organization, and direction for stakeholders. 
b. Stakeholder Education 
The analysis of the interviews demonstrated the fact that policy change 
and enforcement requires stakeholder and legislator buy-in.  Therefore, it is important 
that stakeholders and legislators are educated about disease surveillance, reporting, 
functionality of existing systems, the standard processes driving the data analysis, 
information-sharing practices, and the HIPAA law.  The interviewees stated that 
education of policy makers and legislators can establish a foundation of understanding 
within those groups so that they may affect policy change and ensure that polices are 
effectively enforced.  
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c. Policy  
Existing policies, such as the HIPAA law and other health information 
safeguards were identified as areas where policy change may improve information 
sharing and the disease surveillance and biosurveillance systems overall.  In addition to 
policy change, existing policies that require information sharing and the fact that they are 
not enforced was discussed.  The interviewees noted that the federal government should 
take a leadership role and enforce the information-sharing polices that exist and lead 
efforts to change those that are not effective.  Although existing policies and policy 
change was identified as a major barrier to information sharing, the overarching theme 
that emerged from the case studies and interviews is systemic issues must be addressed.  
Systemic issues related to information sharing may be addressed through standardization.  
2. Standardization  
Standardization was identified as an issue in both the case studies and interviews. 
Standardization would allow disparate systems to be more easily integrated and facilitate 
the establishment of a strong foundation of local reporting systems.  Standardization, 
involves numerous separate activities.  It may be achieved through evaluation and testing, 
standard protocols, standard software requirements, standard infrastructure requirements, 
definitions, a well-defined mission and goals, and levels of access. 
a. Evaluation and Testing 
Evaluation and testing were identified as mechanisms to improve existing 
systems, to enhance information-sharing capabilities, and to create situational awareness 
and a common operating picture.  Evaluation and testing were discussed in the interviews 
as a way to identify capabilities of existing systems, identify best practices, develop basic 
biosurveillance capabilities, as well as identify opportunities for the development of new 
methods to gather data and information.  The case studies also noted that evaluation and 
testing would assist in the development of new technologies, but more importantly, the 
development of standards for information sharing. 
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b. Standards Development 
Standards were a relatively significant thread throughout most of the 
responses during the interview process as well as the case studies.  The development of 
standards is the cornerstone to improving existing systems, information sharing, and in 
the movement toward an integrated national biosurveillance system.  The case studies 
and interviews identified standards that needed to be improved or developed, including 
standardized content and definitions for disease-syndrome classification and reporting; 
basic informatics standards; data and information exchange standards; and standards for 
access and control.  
c. Standardized Content and Definitions 
Standardized content and definitions are a small part of the overall effort 
to improve existing systems and information sharing; however, they are the underpinning 
of information sharing for the entire public health and medical enterprise.  Regarding 
standardized content and definitions, the case studies and interviews noted that there 
presently were various standards in the public health and medical enterprise related to 
information sharing.  The interviews were more specific in identifying standardization 
needs.  This included coding, reporting, and standard case definitions; defining 
biosurveillance and situational awareness; syndrome definitions; and standard detection 
algorithms.  Standard content and definitions can facilitate information sharing between 
and among jurisdictions and sectors.  Increased information sharing between various 
entities enhances the need for standard levels of access.   
d. Levels of Access 
Standardization includes the identification of roles and responsibilities of 
the various participating agencies and stakeholders, as well as levels of access to 
information shared between and among sectors and jurisdictions.  The interviewees stated 
that access to an integrated national biosurveillance system should be role based, and 
limit access based upon “need to know” and “need to share.” It was specifically noted in 
the interviews that access levels would add a dimension of complication to the system. 
Nonetheless, the interviewees stated that levels of access are needed, so that information 
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is shared at appropriate levels, all stakeholders are invested in the process, a culture of 
trust is created between all agencies involved, and the overall reluctance to share 
information and participate in integration efforts is reduced. 
3. Building Local Capacity 
It has been stated numerous times throughout this research that disease 
surveillance and biosurveillance begins at the local level.  Hence, it is important for the 
local level to have the capacity to perform at a high level and collect quality data.  
Building local capacity is a large endeavor because it entails many things.  The case 
studies and interviews mentioned the following ways to build local capacity including, 
building and retaining a competent workforce, assuring funding and resource availability, 
developing and maintaining infrastructure, and collaboration and coordination with 
stakeholders. 
a. Competent Workforce 
Trained professionals are the basis for reliable and valid disease 
surveillance and biosurveillance.  Therefore, based upon the analysis of the case studies 
and interviews, it is vitally important that those who are using the systems are trained and 
competent in system operation and data analysis, as well as disease surveillance and 
reporting.  Trained professionals increase the reliability and validity of the outputs of 
existing systems, thereby increasing the overall reliability and validity of an integrated 
system. Once professionals are trained, daily use of the various information-sharing 
systems builds skills and maintains a competent workforce.  It is also important, as noted 
in the interviews, to retain a competent workforce so that local systems continually 
produce valid and reliable data. Trained professionals are a commodity and funding to 
retain that workforce is important. 
b. Funding and Resources 
Funding for disease surveillance and biosurveillance capacity at the local 
level has started to decrease in recent years, as noted in the interviews.  Local capacity 
cannot be developed or maintained without appropriate funding and resources.  Often, as 
 90
noted in the interviews, financial incentives are the only way to improve surveillance 
capacities and prompt organizations to share information.  Funding and resources provide 
the opportunity for the local level to build capacity through workforce development and 
retention along with the development of solid infrastructure for information sharing.  
c. Infrastructure 
Existing systems are built upon many different platforms and operate 
independently of one another.  The infrastructure, as discussed in the interviews and case 
studies, they use does not facilitate information sharing between and among jurisdictions 
and sectors. The existing infrastructure is the foundation of local disease surveillance and 
biosurveillance systems. Improving the existing infrastructure, as noted in the interviews, 
could build local capacity, improve individual systems, facilitate information sharing, and 
encourage collaboration and coordination of various stakeholders.  
d. Collaboration and Coordination 
Improving existing systems and building local capacity requires a 
collaborative effort, as discussed in the case studies.  Stakeholder buy-in is important to 
the overall success of information-sharing initiatives.  It also allows for the development 
of a shared understanding of the information needs, what information can be shared, 
mechanisms that can be used to facilitate information sharing, and an overall 
understanding of the purpose of information sharing. This may lead to a reduction in the 
reluctance of organizations to participate in integrated systems. 
E. INTEGRATION OF CURRENT SYSTEMS 
One of the approaches suggested in the literature to improve information sharing 
for common operating picture and near real-time situational awareness is the integration 
of existing systems, including national systems.  The interviewees were asked if these 
systems could be integrated or if it was impossible.  The interviewees had differing 
viewpoints related to this question, including why the integration would not be possible 
or why it would not be useful.  The interviews revealed that the challenge of integration 
lies in the fact that there are so many systems that exist across the spectrum from the 
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private sector to the national level.  A few national systems were noted in the interviews, 
which could possibly be integrated to form a piece of a national biosurveillance system.  
The themes that emerged in the analysis were there should be standards, a federal leader, 
and stakeholder buy-in, as well as the system must meet the needs of all levels of players 
from local to national.  This, as identified during the interviews, should be one of the 
major functions of an integrated national system—the ability to have scalable common 
operating picture and situational awareness based upon jurisdictional needs. 
F. INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL SYSTEMS AND ONE PRIMARY 
COLLECTOR 
Although there are a vast number of current systems, there was no single system 
that the interviewees identified that could be used as the primary collector of information.  
It is important to note, as mentioned in one interview, that legislation established the 
National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) in the Department of Homeland 
Security for this specific purpose.  Nonetheless, as also noted by the interviewee and in 
the literature, at present the NBIC is not functioning as was hoped because it is having 
difficulty obtaining the data needed to fulfill its mission.  The reasoning behind the 
difficulties may be highlighted by the interviewees’ responses, including the difficulty 
conceptualizing an all encompassing, one-stop-shop system, as well as other barriers to 
information sharing mentioned earlier in this chapter.  Although the interviewees noted 
that an integrated national biosurveillance system was difficult to conceptualize, ways to 
achieve integration and facilitate successful information sharing were offered.  This 
included maintaining individual system integrity, building capacity, federal leadership, a 
map, and master plan that detailed the end results of such a system. 
G. BENEFITS OF AN INTEGRATED NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE 
SYSTEM 
Even though it is difficult to identify a single system to serve as the primary 
collector of biosurveillance data, the case studies and interviews identified the benefits of 
an integrated national biosurveillance system.  The primary benefit is the establishment 
of a national common operating picture and situational awareness, as well as the ability to 
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generate state, regional, and local common operating picture and situational awareness.  
In regard to health security in the United States, the analysis indicated that having a 
common operating picture and near real-time situational awareness is vitally important.  
There are issues associated with having an integrated national biosurveillance system, 
including the differences in priorities and requirements, not always a need for integrated 
information, and the specific and separate missions of existing systems.  Overall, the 
analysis indicated that a national system has tangible benefits and has a function to serve 
at all levels.   
The main question, this thesis sought to answer is: How can the public 
health/medical enterprise improve information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors, 
to rapidly detect and respond to naturally occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or 
exposures, and to create better situational awareness and a common operating picture?   
The case studies and interviews identified strategies to improve overall 
information sharing, including the need for federal leadership and a roadmap for 
implementation of an integrated national biosurveillance system, which includes a 
conceptual model.   
H. IMPROVING INFORMATION SHARING 
Information sharing is the foundation for effective biosurveillance; therefore, it is 
vital that there are few impediments to the process.  Although there were a significant 
amount of barriers to information sharing that were identified in the analysis of the case 
studies and interviews, the analysis also identified ways to address and overcome those 
barriers.  The most promising initiative discussed in the interviews is the move to 
electronic health records, health information exchanges, and meaningful use.  In addition, 
the interviewees stressed that policies must be addressed so that barriers to information 
sharing can be removed.  Policy, as noted in the interviews, is one of the major 
impediments to information sharing, because often times the policies are misinterpreted 




overall improvements to existing surveillance and biosurveillance systems that was 
identified in the case studies and interviews that would create better situational awareness 
and common operating picture.  
I. ROADMAP FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
Presently, as stated in the interviews, there is no roadmap or implementation plan 
for improving information sharing or the creation of an integrated national 
biosurveillance system.  Several initiatives were discussed during the interviews, 
including legislation, strategies, and initiatives, such as the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act (PAHPA), the National Response Framework (NRF), the National 
Biosurveillance Strategy, and others.  The fact that a definite strategy could not be 
identified reinforces statements made by the interviewees that there is a need for federal 
leadership and a roadmap outlining national priorities and planning. 
J. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
One piece of an overall roadmap is the creation of an organizational model that 
outlines the ways in which information sharing can be improved to create better 
situational awareness and common operating picture.  This, as discussed in the 
interviews, would be useful in providing a guide for capacity building, implementation, 
establishing standards, governance, roles and responsibilities, and providing 
accountability.  The interviewees noted that the development of such a model is 
challenging.  The major impediment to information sharing identified in the interviews 
and case studies was the reluctance of many agencies to work within a collaborative 
network.  The overall consensus was that an organizational model for information sharing 
and an integrated national biosurveillance system would be useful in driving the initiative 
forward with a specific focus. 
K. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the review of existing literature and the analysis of the case studies 
and interviews, it is evident that information sharing can be improved to create near real-
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time situational awareness and common operating picture.  The interviewees stated that 
the road to improving information sharing is quite long and difficult.   
The case studies and interview analysis identifies requirements for the public 
health and medical enterprise to achieve improved information sharing to create 
situational awareness and common operating picture, including three overarching themes, 
leadership, policy, and strategy.  The analysis offers numerous means, some of which 
currently exist or are in development, to achieve these requirements and facilitate the 
process, such as standard development, policy change or development, capacity building, 
education, funding, stakeholder involvement, and, ultimately, federal leadership, with a 
roadmap for information sharing and for implementation of an integrated national 
biosurveillance system.     
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VI. LEAPS MODEL  
A solid foundation in health information sharing and disease surveillance is 
paramount for the public health and medical enterprise to improve information sharing 
across jurisdictions and sectors to more rapidly detect and respond to naturally occurring 
or intentional disease outbreaks or exposures and to create better situational awareness 
and a common operating picture.  There are three components that have emerged through 
the research as central to establishing this solid foundation to improve information 
sharing—leadership and national level policy and strategy related to standardization, 
capacity building, and collaboration and coordination. 
This chapter will outline a conceptual model for the public health and medical 
enterprise to improve information sharing, based upon review and analysis of existing 
literature, the analysis of case studies, and interviews.  This chapter will also attempt to 
establish a conceptual framework that is designed to improve information sharing 
through identifying leadership for the initiative; and by identifying and enforcing policies 
that will facilitate information sharing and the integration of the systems. Additionally, it 
will outline a strategy for standardization, to build capacity, and encourage collaboration 
and coordination at the all levels to facilitate information sharing across jurisdictions and 
sectors.  
A. LEADERSHIP 
The foundation of the LEAPS model (see Figure 1) is leadership; specifically the 
need for a leader to guide the overall information-sharing strategy development and to 
serve as the focal point with authority and resources to drive the effort forward.  
Leadership from one central entity is necessary to guide the initiative to improve 
information sharing through a collaborative effort, including policy development and 
enforcement, and the identification of a strategy to establish a strong foundation for 
information sharing and ultimately an integrated national biosurveillance enterprise.   
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1. Collaborative Leadership 
A collaborative leadership effort is necessary to drive the efforts to improve 
information sharing in the public health and medical enterprise.  Collaborative leadership 
is defined by the author of this thesis as that which fosters collaboration to solve agreed 
upon issues at each level of information processes.  These levels include: private sector, 
local, state, and federal agencies. However, the overarching governance should come 
from the federal level.  A single entity at the federal level should be identified to lead and 
coordinate the initiative, through collaboration with other federal stakeholders.  This 
entity should be recognized by the White House as the leader of the initiative. All 
stakeholders should be mandated to collaborate with this leader to develop and 
implement all aspects of the initiative to improve information sharing. The leadership 
should be charged with the identification or development and enforcement of policies 
related to information sharing and an overarching strategy for information sharing and 
biosurveillance among federal, state, local, and private sector stakeholders. 
B. IDENTIFYING AND ENFORCING POLICY  
The second component of the LEAPS model is policy. Presently, there is a 
general lack of understanding and enforcement of many of the existing policies related to 
health data information sharing and ways to improve information sharing across 
jurisdictions and sectors.  First and foremost, it is important that stakeholders understand 
existing policies; therefore, they should be educated on the nuances of the policies in 
existence to increase their understanding of the purpose, limitations, and allowances in 
order to facilitate information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors. The policies and 
the activities related to increasing the understanding of the existing policies should be 
addressed at the federal level to ensure continuity of the message and to ensure they serve 
their function to protect data but, at the same time, facilitate information sharing.  
Policies related to information sharing are not often strictly enforced at the federal level.  
Therefore, an effort, initiated at the federal level, should be made to enforce these 
policies so that information sharing is not impeded.  In addition to increasing 
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stakeholders’ understanding of policies and policy enforcement, new policies may have 
to be developed to encourage information sharing, specifically in regard to identifying or 
establishing a strategy for information sharing.   
C. INFORMATION-SHARING STRATEGY 
In order to achieve a coordinated effort to improve information sharing for the 
public health and medical enterprise, a single information-sharing strategy must be 
identified and communicated with stakeholders at all levels.  This strategy should provide 
clear guidance, organization, and direction for stakeholders—providing an overarching 
national level framework for improving information sharing to create better situational 
awareness and common operating picture.  This third component of the LEAPS model 
should include standards, a capacity-building element, and a mechanism to ensure 
collaboration and coordination between stakeholders at all levels. 
1. Standards 
Standardization is the mechanism by which the LEAPS model will establish the 
framework for a solid foundation for information sharing.  Federal leadership should 
initiate an effort to standardize the information-sharing process.  The development and 
identification of standards allows for interoperability between existing systems and new 
systems yet to be developed, which facilitates the information sharing across jurisdictions 
and sectors.  Standardization efforts should include the evaluation and testing of existing 
and new technologies; development of standard protocols and requirements; standard 
definitions; and levels of access.  
a. Evaluation and Testing 
In order to achieve the goal of improved information sharing, the current 
state of existing information-sharing systems must be established.  Evaluation and testing 
are mechanisms that can be used to assess the current status of the existing systems and to 
ensure that the public health and medical enterprise meets an established baseline for 
information sharing. A national tool for evaluation of disease surveillance and 
biosurveillance systems should be developed.  All existing systems should be evaluated 
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with this standard tool to identify best practices, identify a baseline of surveillance and 
biosurveillance capabilities, and to make recommendations for improvements and 
identify opportunities for development of new technologies.  Newly developed 
technologies should be evaluated and tested with this same standardized process.  The 
evaluation and testing of existing and newly developed systems will allow for the 
identification and implementation of standards related to the information-sharing process. 
b. Standards Development 
Standards for information sharing are the cornerstone for improving 
existing systems, information sharing, and in the movement toward an integrated national 
biosurveillance system.  Standards that can facilitate information sharing are: standard 
detection algorithms, data standards, interoperability standards, standardized content and 
definitions, and system access and control standards.   
Standard detection algorithms for syndromic surveillance would 
standardize the methodology used for aberration detection within syndromic surveillance 
systems.  Data and information exchange standards would establish a minimum set of 
requirements for the data points to be collected and transmitted from each level within the 
public health and medical enterprise, ensuring that each entity was consistently collecting 
the same information using the same methods.  In addition to data and information 
exchange standards, having a baseline standard for interoperability for all systems 
facilitates information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors because all systems will 
have the necessary components to communicate with one another.  Each of the activities 
listed thus far involve standardization of elements of the information-sharing systems. 
Standardized content and definitions are the underpinnings of data collection activities 
and levels of access prescribe the mechanism by which different entities have access to 
the data collected.  
c. Standardized Content and Definitions 
Standardized content and definitions establish the basis of public health 
and medical information sharing.  This includes standard definitions for syndromes in 
syndromic surveillance, cases for public health disease reporting, and mechanisms for 
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coding disease information within information-sharing systems.  These definitions must 
be established at or accepted by the federal level leadership and communicated to all 
stakeholders in the public health and medical enterprise.  Above and beyond definitions 
for syndromes and diseases, there should be standard definitions identified by the federal 
leadership for situational awareness and common operating picture in the context of 
public health and medical information sharing, as well as a standard definition for 
biosurveillance.  Having standard definitions for these central concepts for information 
sharing establishes a baseline for understanding and sets baseline criteria for all 
stakeholders in the public health and medical enterprise, which will facilitate information 
sharing.   
d. Levels of Access 
Identification of appropriate levels of access to the data and information 
being shared is an important aspect of the LEAPS model.  Standardized levels of access 
provide a degree of protection for the data as well as facilitating information sharing.  It 
fosters trust in the information-sharing system by ensuring that only those who “need to 
know” have access to the full data set and that others can gain situational awareness and 
common operating picture by having access to aggregate data.  Standardized levels of 
access should be based upon two principles “need to know” and “need to share” and 
should be role and jurisdiction based.  Access should be tiered, granting full viewing 
rights to those at appropriate levels who “need to know” and an aggregate set of viewing 
rights to those who the information is being shared with.  Levels of access provide 
safeguards for those sharing and those receiving the information so that data privacy laws 
are not violated and help to reduce the general reluctance to share information among 
jurisdictions.   
2. Building Capacity 
Having the capacity to share information across jurisdictions is an important 
factor in improving information sharing to rapidly detect and respond to naturally 
occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or exposures and to create better situational 
awareness and a common operating picture.  Disease surveillance and biosurveillance 
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begin at the local level; therefore, it is vitally important that these entities have the 
capacity to perform these functions at a high level and collect quality data.  Ways the 
LEAPS model offers to build capacity for information sharing are: building and 
maintaining a competent workforce, assuring funding and resource availability, 
developing and maintaining infrastructure, and collaboration and coordination with 
stakeholders.   
a. Competent Workforce 
The starting point for information sharing at the local level is a competent 
workforce.  Training those who are charged with disease surveillance and biosurveillance 
activities is at the core of the development of a competent workforce.  A federally 
sponsored training program for the disease surveillance and biosurveillance workforce is 
necessary to ensure staff is adequately trained to perform their job tasks at a high level of 
efficiency and effectiveness.  This training should include basic epidemiological 
concepts, including: disease concepts and definitions; data collection and analysis 
concepts, as well as, system functionality; and the importance of information sharing.  In 
addition to training existing personnel, highly trained and competent personnel should be 
recruited to fill new positions and vacancies in the public health and medical enterprise. 
A trained and competent workforce increases the validity and reliability of the data 
collected as well as the information that is shared between sectors and jurisdictions, 
thereby creating better situational awareness and common operating picture.   
Once the workforce is trained, it is also important to retain a competent 
workforce to ensure sustained high quality information sharing.  Retention of a highly 
trained competent workforce is directly associated with the ability to provide adequate 
compensation and continuing education.  Therefore, it is necessary that the public health 
and medical enterprise have adequate funding to dedicate to this endeavor.  Increased 
federal funding is one such mechanism to ensure this is achieved. 
b. Funding and Resources 
The LEAPS model strategy section includes a funding and resource 
component, as this ensures the continued maintenance and improvement of existing 
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systems and the development of new technologies and mechanisms to facilitate 
information sharing.  Federal level funding has been the impetus for the development and 
sustainment of most disease surveillance and biosurveillance systems.  Federal level 
funding must be maintained in order to preserve the current level of information sharing 
and build the capacity to improve information sharing in the public health and medical 
enterprise.  Federal incentives for information sharing are also an important factor in 
improving information sharing and to prompt entities to share information with others.  
Most local level disease surveillance and biosurveillance efforts are funded by federal 
funds, if this funding continues to decrease or completely disappears, these existing 
systems will languish and eventually become non-existent.  Continued federal funding 
and resources provide the local level with the opportunity to continue to develop and 
improve the existing infrastructure and workforce to improve information sharing and to 
create better situational awareness and common operating picture. 
c. Infrastructure 
The LEAPS model acknowledges that the existing disease surveillance 
and biosurveillance infrastructure forms the basis of the local level disease surveillance 
and biosurveillance activities.  Most existing systems operate independently of one 
another, which does not facilitate information sharing between jurisdictions within the 
public health and medical enterprise.  In order for the public health and medical 
enterprise to improve information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors to rapidly 
detect and respond to naturally occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or exposures 
and to create better situational awareness and common operating picture, investments and 
improvements must be made in the existing infrastructure.  Additionally, investments 
must be made to connect the various pieces of this infrastructure and to develop new 
technologies to facilitate information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors. This will 
build capacity at the local level, where information sharing begins, and can encourage 
collaboration and coordination among the various stakeholders to smooth the progress of 
information sharing.   
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3. Collaboration and Coordination 
Improving information sharing within the public health and medical enterprise 
requires a collaborative effort.  As such, the LEAPS model proposes that federal 
leadership must guide this collaborative effort and foster stakeholder buy-in at all levels 
of the enterprise.  Stakeholder buy-in is essential for improving information sharing.  
This allows for the development of a shared vision and mission, as well as a shared 
understanding of the information needs, what information can be shared, mechanisms 
that can be used to facilitate information sharing, and an overall understanding of the 
larger purpose and goal of information sharing.   
The coordination of information-sharing activities should begin at the federal 
level and be a collective effort from the federal level to the local level, including the 
private sector.  A federally developed plan or framework, such as the LEAPS model for 
the public health and medical enterprise to improve information sharing could serve as 
the impetus and guide for the collaborative effort by outlining leadership, policy, 
strategy, and mechanisms to achieve improved information sharing to create better 
situational awareness and a common operating picture.    
D. CONCLUSION 
The primary focus of this chapter was upon the public health and medical 
enterprise and how information sharing can be improved to create better situational 
awareness and common operating picture. The conceptual model developed in this 
chapter focuses upon three elements to improve information sharing—leadership, policy, 
and strategy—and offers a means by which to achieve those elements.  
Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the LEAPS model and shows how 
each component is interrelated and connected.  Federal leadership is the foundation of the 
LEAPS model, followed by policy and strategy.  Policies must be enforced and 
developed to facilitate information sharing.  Additionally, a strategy must be identified to 
guide the overall process, which includes standards, building capacity, and collaboration 
and coordination.  The LEAPS model provides a solid foundation for the public health 
and medical enterprise to improve information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors to 
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more rapidly detect and respond to naturally occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or 
exposures and to create better situational awareness and common operating picture. 
 
Figure 1.   LEAPS Model 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis developed the LEAPS model, a conceptual framework that identifies 
collaborative leadership governed at the federal level, policy, and strategy as key enablers 
to facilitate the information-sharing process.  This chapter will outline specific 
recommendations for achieving concepts contained in the LEAPS model to improve 
information sharing. 
A. THE LEAPS MODEL 
 Collaborative Leadership  
o Foster collaborative leadership between the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention and the Department for Homeland Security through the 
NBAS (National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee) and the NBIS 
(National Biosurveillance Integration System), with the DHS being the 
overall governing body for the larger biosurveillance initiative. 
o The DHS and CDC should also collaborate with other stakeholders in the 
private sector, local and state agencies to identify, set, and enforce policy 
and strategy to improve information sharing. 
 Policy  
o Educate stakeholders on HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act) of and HITECH Act4 using a standardized national-
level education program, versus the numerous methods and programs that 
presently exist.   
o Develop and implement a new Presidential Directive that identifies DHS 
as the lead agency over the larger biosurveillance initiative, in close 
collaboration with the CDC for the human biosurveillance aspects. 
 Strategy: Create one national strategy based upon the LEAPS model that 
incorporates the specific recommendations within this chapter, as well as many of 
                                                 
4 “The HITECH Act recently amended HIPAA by expanding its reach, strengthening certain aspects of 
the regulations, and increasing federal enforcement tools” (Goldstein & Rein, 2010). 
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the concepts that currently exist in the National Health Security Strategy (HHS, 
2009) and the National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health (CDC 
Biosurveillance Coordination Unit, 2010).  This strategy will address the items as 
identified in the proposed LEAPS model and should serve as the single strategy 
for improving information sharing across jurisdictions and sectors to rapidly 
detect and respond to naturally occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or 
exposures and to create better situational awareness and a common operating 
picture. 
o Evaluation and Testing:  
 The strategy should outline a process to identify and establish an 
interagency working group to develop, implement, and administer 
the evaluation and testing component of the LEAPS model 
strategy, to evaluate and test existing systems as well as emerging 
technologies. 
o Standards Identification and Development:  Implement the LEAPS 
model that recommends the creation of a single standard set, to establish 
minimum standards for detection algorithms, data and information 
exchange, by combining existing standards when applicable and the 
creation of new standards when necessary. 
 Detection Algorithms—The International Society for Disease 
Surveillance should identify best practices and set forth 
recommendations, which will be incorporated into the LEAPS 
model strategy to set the minimum standards for detection 
algorithms for syndromic surveillance.   
 Data and Information Exchange Standards—The PHIN (Public 
Health Information Network), meaningful use, and the HITSP 
(Health Information Technology Standards Panel) Biosurveillance 
Interoperability Specification standards should be incorporated into 
the LEAPS model as the minimum acceptable standards for data 
and information exchange.   
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o Standardized Content and Definitions: The LEAPS model recommends 
the combination of existing standards and definitions into a single standard 
set that establishes minimum standards for data definitions and ensures 
continuity and consistency of data collection.  Recommendations are listed 
below. 
 Case Definitions—The Council for State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists (CSTE) and CDC case definitions for public 
health surveillance should be incorporated into the LEAPS model 
strategy as the standard case definitions for public health 
surveillance and disease reporting.   
 Syndrome Definitions—The definitions contained in the Draft 
PHIN Messaging Guide for Syndromic Surveillance should be 
included in the LEAPS model strategy as the standard syndrome 
definitions for syndromic surveillance.   
 The National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health defines 
situational awareness as: “the perception of elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status 
in the near future” (CDC Biosurveillance Coordination Unit, 
2010,p. 11). 
 HSPD 21 defines biosurveillance as: 
The process of active data-gathering with appropriate analysis and 
interpretation of biosphere data that might relate to disease activity 
and threats to human or animal health—whether infectious, toxic, 
metabolic, or otherwise, and regardless of intentional or natural 
origin—in order to achieve early warning of health threats, early 
detection of health events, and overall situational awareness of 
disease activity. (White House, 2008, p. 1) 
 A definition for common operating picture in the context of the 
public health and medical enterprise does not exist; therefore, the 
Emergency Management Principles and Practices for Health Care 
Systems definition is recommended.  It defines common operating 
picture as: “a broad view of the overall situation as reflected by 
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situation reports, aerial photography, and other information and 
intelligence” (The Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk 
Management [ICDRM], 2006).   
o Levels of Access: Implement the LEAPS model that recommends levels 
of access follow generally accepted practices that currently exist within 
the public health and medical enterprise.  This would establish tiered, role-
based levels of access based upon area of responsibility, granting access to 
aggregate data to certain levels to facilitate situational awareness and 
common operating picture.  See Figure 2. 
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Figure 1.   LEAPS Model—Levels of Access 
 Building Capacity: The LEAPS model strategy includes three components for 
building capacity: competent workforce, funding and resources, and 
infrastructure.  These components are also included as part of the National Health 




Human Health (CDC Biosurveillance Coordination Unit, 2010).  The LEAPS 
model supports the general recommendations of both of these strategies; however 
it offers specific actions to build capacity. 
o Competent Workforce 
 The LEAPS model recommends the implementation of a federally 
developed training and education program and standards for the 
existing and future workforce.  A comprehensive training 
curriculum should be developed to include basic epidemiological 
principles, biosurveillance principles, basic information-sharing 
education, as well as statistical analysis and education on the 
functions of the various systems used to facilitate the information-
sharing process.   
o Funding and Resources 
 Sustained funding for building capacity is critical to improving 
information sharing within the public health and medical 
enterprise. This funding should be administered through the DHS 
and distributed to stakeholders at all levels. 
o Infrastructure 
 The LEAPS model recognizes that to continue to improve 
information sharing, efforts must be made to sustain and maintain 
existing infrastructure and build new infrastructure through 
sustained funding and resources. 
 Infrastructure similar to the New York Health Commerce System 
Platform could be used as a small-scale model for an integrated 
system architecture. 
 Collaboration and Coordination 
o The LEAPS model recommends the encouragement of collaboration and 
coordination through funding of collaborative efforts to improve 
information sharing.   
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o The LEAPS model recognizes that the collaborative effort to improve 
information sharing must start at the federal level and should use the 
federal level policy and strategy to guide the collaboration effort 
B. SUMMARY 
Federal governance is the foundation of the LEAPS model.  It must be present in 
order to realize the other two pieces—policy and strategy.  Improving information 
sharing hinges upon federal level governance to identify and enforce policy, as well as, 
develop an overarching federal strategy to enhance the ability of the public health and 
medical enterprise, to share information across jurisdictions to rapidly detect and respond 
to naturally occurring or intentional disease outbreaks or exposures and to create better 
situational awareness and a common operating picture. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Containing the spread of disease or responding to other human health 
hazards in an interconnected world requires active vigilance for signs of 
an adverse public health event, rapid validation of its presence, and swift 
characterization so that resources and adaptive strategies can be 
employed effectively. Greater information sharing and strengthened 
collaborations among public health, healthcare, environmental, animal 
and plant health communities along with partnerships with private sector 
organizations addressing common goals can unleash the power of health-
related information to prevent, protect, and mitigate the health threats and 
hazards that Americans face [emphasis added]. (CDC Biosurveillance 
Coordination Unit, 2010) 
A. IMPROVED INFORMATION SHARING IS NECESSARY 
The need for the public health and medical enterprise to share information has 
increased over the last decade.  Events such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) outbreak, natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
outbreak, and other naturally occurring outbreaks, such as the recent Shiga toxin-
producing E. coli O104 (STEC O104:H4) infections occurring in and associated with 
travel to Germany “have highlighted the need for real-time information exchange to 
enhance government’s awareness and understanding of public health events in order for 
the government to prevent or respond to situations as they unfold” (Rolka, O'Connor, & 
Walker, 2008).  In addition to the threats increasing over the past decade, there has been 
an influx of policies and strategies, related to improving information sharing, within the 
public health and medical enterprise and the larger homeland security enterprise, 
including HSPDs 9, 10, and 21, PAHPA, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States Act of 2007, the 
National Health Security Strategy, and the National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human 
Health.  A significant amount of attention has been, and will continue to be, given to 
improving information sharing within the public health and medical enterprise.  Great 
strides have been made; however, there is still a significant amount that can be done to 
improve information sharing and these improvements must be made before we can begin 
to integrate systems for a national biosurveillance enterprise.  
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B. THE WAY FORWARD 
This thesis set out to determine whether a national integrated biosurveillance 
enterprise can improve information sharing for situational awareness and common 
operating picture, including outlining who should supply the data, how the data should be 
shared, and recommendations for how to integrate the disparate systems that presently 
exist.   
This research identified a significant amount of barriers to information sharing; 
however, it also identified ways to address and overcome those barriers.  Many promising 
initiatives were discussed including the move to electronic health records, health 
information exchanges, and meaningful use.  These initiatives offer a mechanism to 
enable information sharing between and among entities and jurisdictions that is not 
overly burdensome upon any one entity.  These are technological advances or “systems” 
that can facilitate information sharing; however, as noted in this research, there are more 
basic things that must occur.   
1. LEAPS Model 
The LEAPS model was developed in this thesis to serve as a conceptual 
framework to guide the process to improve information sharing through the development 
of a strong foundation centered upon leadership, policy, and strategy.  It is rooted in a 
collaborative leadership structure with a single federal entity appointed to lead the 
initiative.  The overall mission of this leader is the development, identification, and 
enforcement of policy, and to drive the strategy for improving information sharing.  The 
LEAPS model strategy includes standards, capacity building, and encourages 
collaboration and coordination, which are the basis for a solid information-sharing 
foundation. 
2. Limitations and Further Research 
This research provides only a glimpse of information sharing within the public 
health and medical enterprise. This research did not set out to be a total review of the 
public health and medical enterprise and current information-sharing practices.  It was 
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meant to give a broad-based view of the some of the ways that information sharing may 
be improved to more rapidly detect and respond to naturally occurring or intentional 
disease outbreaks or exposures and to create better situational awareness and common 
operating picture.  There has been and continues to be a great deal of research related to 
information sharing and biosurveillance. The case studies and interviews presented here 
were a small, but representative sample of the vast amount of literature and professionals 
available. There is further research that must be done to construct an integrated national 
biosurveillance enterprise including that necessary to specify details about: 1) what data 
is needed; 2) who should supply the data; and 3) how existing systems should be 
integrated. This may be accomplished through a more in-depth analysis of existing 
literature along with a more extensive interview process that includes a larger sample of 
interviewees. In addition, research should be conducted to measure the success of current 
initiatives, identify best practices, as well as to identify future actions to improve 
information sharing.  This research and much of the literature identified a general lack of 
science base in regard to information sharing within the public health and medical 
enterprise and regarding biosurveillance.  Research should be conducted in these areas to 
build and expand the overall knowledge base.   
3. Further Application 
The LEAPS model developed in this research may have a broader application 
above and beyond public health information sharing.  The basic premise of this model, a 
strong foundation, is paramount to improving information sharing within any field and 
any context, including those on a more global level, and within law enforcement and the 
intelligence communities.  
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